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I. INTRODUCTION
“The concern over each of the[] symptoms of
immigration—whether harmful or beneficial—can be
traced to a single issue: the American people care about
who the immigrants are. It matters if the immigrants might
need social services or if they might instead contribute to
the funding of the programs in the welfare state. It matters
if the immigrants compete with disadvantaged workers in
the labor market and take their jobs away, or if the
immigrants do jobs that natives do not particularly want and
would go unfilled in the immigrants’ absence. . . . [I]t
matters if the immigrants will want to adapt to the social,
economic, and political environment of the United States,
or if they will fight to maintain their language and culture
for several generations.”
1
-George Borjas
Immigration reform and the enforcement of immigration law
have gained visibility in recent years. Even prior to the recent
upsurge of attention to comprehensive immigration reform, the
2
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States and President
Obama’s Deferred Action towards Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
3
policy thrust to the forefront of national attention the questions that
4
define the deportation regime. Deportation as a legal regime, rather
than a specific sanction, is defined by answers to three core questions:
how many people should be deported? Which people, or what types
of people, should be deported? Finally, who should choose how
many and what types of people should be deported? The battle
1

GEORGE BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY, 4–5 (1999).
2
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
3
DACA is the executive policy of deferring action with regard to some young
th
people, who arrived prior to their 16 birthday, and have no criminal records. See
Deferred Action towards Childhood Arrivals, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals.
4
In this Article, “deportation” refers to what that term meant until 1996: the
removal of a non-citizen, who is already inside the country, as opposed to
“exclusion,” the removal of a non-citizen who is forbidden from entry at a border or
port of entry. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) consolidated exclusion and deportation, and labeled the resulting
proceedings “removal” proceedings. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–597
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. §
1015(e)–(f) (2006)) §§ 304, 308. Because the concern here is exclusively with
interior enforcement, this Article employs the legally outdated, but more
appropriate term “deportation.”
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between the federal government and subnational authorities is waged
largely over the first question, regarding the appropriate level of
enforcement, and the third question, regarding who is authorized to
determine levels of enforcement.
So-called “restrictionist”
jurisdictions proclaim their authority to “add [their] own resources to
the enforcement of federal law,” and thereby to apprehend a greater
5
number of deportable individuals.
On the other hand, noncooperating or “sanctuary” jurisdictions declare that they “don’t do
[the federal government’s] job,” and thereby limit federal access to
6
deportable individuals.
The question of which of the many
deportable non-citizens should be deported is largely relegated to the
background.
This Article argues that it is the second question that ought to be
at the forefront of deportation policy.
In this respect, the
deportation regime is analogous to the immigration admissions
regime. Concerns over immigration, as George Borjas observes, “can
7
be traced to the single” question of “who the immigrants are.”
Similarly, concerns over interior immigration enforcement are at
their core about the problem of selecting whom to deport.
Grappling with this question—indeed, the very fact of asking it—
requires accepting the impossibility and the undesirability of full
enforcement, and the consequent necessity of a priority-based
regime. A priority-based regime must target the least socially
desirable types for expulsion, just as the immigration admissions
regime purports to select the most socially desirable types for
admission into the United States. The thorny problem of identifying
and ranking “types” in terms of social desirability calls for evaluating
the most serious consequences of immigrant presence, as judged by
those who experience those consequences. The consequences of
immigrant presence—and thus, the expected consequences of
deporting some immigrants—are spatially variable and numerous.
This fact has underappreciated implications for the third question
defining the deportation regime, the question of who should choose
whom to deport.
This Article suggests that while functional
considerations justify exclusive federal control over the level of
enforcement, the nature of the most keenly experienced
5

Brief for Petitioners at *26, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Santa Clara County Ends Collaboration with ICE, NEW AMERICA MEDIA (Oct. 18,
2011), http://newamericamedia.org/2011/10/santa-clara-county-ends-collaboration
-with-ice.php (quoting County Board Supervisor George Shirakawa).
7
BORJAS, supra note 1, 4–5.
6
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consequences of migrant presence calls for sub-federal participation
in priority-setting.
Although there is a growing literature on immigration
8
enforcement and immigration federalism, it has thus far overlooked
the question of how deportation priorities should be determined,
and what implications the answers have for the division of labor
among levels of governments. Some immigration scholars have been
critical of most sub-federal involvement in immigration enforcement
9
generally. Others, by contrast, acknowledge that some state and local
participation must take place and that this is not necessarily a cause
10
for regret. Scholars have called broadly for “learning to live with
11
immigration
federalism,”
“taking
immigration
federalism
12
seriously,” and embracing a “new power-sharing theory” of
13
immigration federalism. When this scholarship addresses the subfederal role in the deportation regime, the focus is on the activities
8

The term “immigration federalism” is usually credited to Hiroshi Motomura,
in his article Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (describing “immigration federalism” as a system
in which sub-federal actors participate in making and implementing immigration law
and policy).
9
See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS LAW J. 1673 (2011) (arguing against state
experimentation with immigration enforcement in part on the grounds that states
cannot fully internalize the costs of their experiments); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of
Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1613
(2008) (urging more critical evaluation of the use of state and local police powers to
influence the enforcement of immigration laws); Michael A. Olivas, ImmigrationRelated State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 36 (2007) (“[T]here is no good or legitimate
reason to extend immigration enforcement to non-federal authorities any more than
current law already allocates.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution
of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
10
See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 634 (2008) (arguing for federal-state cooperation
such as using agreements delegating enforcement power); Peter H. Schuck, Taking
Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 71–77 (2007) (advocating “a
more robust role for the states in certain areas of immigration policy” including
enforcement).
11
Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627 (1997).
12
Schuck, supra note 10.
13
Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 617; see also Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 827 (2008) (arguing that as
a constitutional matter, “immigration authority may be shared among levels of
government,” which should “open[] the door to weighing the interests and values
traditionally implicated in debates over the respective roles of the national and
subnational governments”).
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that states and localities have or are in fact engaged in, such as
federal delegation of authority to local officials and unilateral
14
immigration-status verification policies.
Most scholars and commentators find existing modes of subfederal influence on enforcement to be at least problematic, if not
15
outright unconstitutional. They may well be right. But there is no
reason why participation of states and localities in the deportation
regime must be limited to the kinds of activities these actors have
thus far undertaken. This Article suggests that the purposes of the
deportation regime would be best served by opening an alternative
avenue for sub-federal influence. Because centrally crafted and
nation-wide priorities are poor proxies for sorting migrants on the
basis of social desirability, the deportation regime would be improved
if sub-national governments were explicitly invited to articulate their
priorities. At the same time, because states and localities do not bear
the full costs of administering the deportation regime, they are not
well-positioned to determine enforcement levels.
The de jure federal monopoly on setting priorities for
deportation restricts the channels whereby states and localities may
influence deportation outcomes. At present, states and localities
cannot meaningfully influence which types of non-citizens the federal
government chooses to deport. Thus, their opposition to federal
policy takes the form of efforts to overwhelm federal immigration
authorities with enforcement requests or obstruct federal
14

See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 635 (arguing that federal / sub-federal
cooperation—such as via 287(g) agreements—should be pursued); Schuck, supra
note 10, at 74–75 (arguing for coordination between federal and sub-federal
authorities via 287(g) agreements); Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1597–98 (discussing the
rise of mandatory and non-verification policies with regard to immigration status,
287(g) agreements, and substantive criminal laws that parallel federal prohibitions).
15
See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 635 (noting that the constitutionally and
statutorily permitted space for local participation in law enforcement is limited to
express delegation via 287(g) agreements and standard law enforcement); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819, 1819 (2011) (cautioning
that “[a]ny federal policy that . . . permit[s] state and local priorities to decide which
noncitizens will be exposed to federal immigration enforcement [] risks abdication
of federal authority over immigration”). For arguments about unconstitutionality of
dominant modes of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement, see, e.g.,
Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of
Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L. J. 251 (2011), Michael J. Wishnie, State
and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004). But
see David Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 101, 107 (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that at least “nonbinding executive
enforcement policies cannot, and should not, preempt sub-federal law”).
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enforcement through non-cooperation.
In this way, all
disagreements between the levels of government culminate in a
stand-off regarding levels of enforcement. Disagreements over how
many people the country should deport are unresolvable and
unproductive. This general proposition applies with particular force
to the present circumstances. To quote the former Governor of
Mississippi, Haley Barbour, with regard to the prospects of deporting
the entire ten to eleven million-strong population of unauthorized
16
immigrants, “there’s a 100% chance that it’s not going to happen.”
And ultimately, the disagreement over how many people to deport is
divorced from the core reasons why anyone opposes, welcomes, or
tolerates unauthorized immigration. People oppose or welcome
immigration, legal or not, for substantive reasons. This is why people
care about “who the immigrants are.” For the same reasons, people
care about who the deportees are. Inviting sub-federal participation
in formulating priorities for deportation would reset the focal point
of the (inevitable) federal/sub-federal disagreements about
deportation policy to the more important questions of who, or which
types of immigrants, should be selected for deportation, and which
for forbearance. Such a prospect would make for a deportation
regime that produces enforcement patterns more closely
approximating societal preferences.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II articulates a view of a
17
well-functioning, or “optimal,” deportation regime.
Though the
deportation regime may be seen as serving two functions, screening
and law enforcement, Part II.A and II.B show that both lead to
harmonious conclusions regarding the key features of the regime,
including the determination of which types of immigration violators
should be subjected to a higher probability of deportation. Part II.C.
then explains why the nature of costs and benefits relevant to setting
priorities for deportation—that is, identifying types of immigration
law violators that should be prioritized as targets for deportation—
calls for sub-federal participation. Part III examines more closely the
16

Governor Haley Barbour, Morning Keynote Address, 10th Annual
Immigration Law and Policy Conference (Oct. 31, 2013).
17
“Optimal” here invokes policies most conducive to the welfare of the host
society under given constraints, such as constitutional limits on policy choices and
the reality of widespread violations of the immigration laws. The Article adopts the
welfare of the host society as the relevant criterion not because the welfare of
immigrants or immigrant-sending societies is unimportant, but in recognition of the
fact that it is the natives’ welfare that overwhelmingly drives policy-making. The
Article proceeds from the assumption that some violators will be deported, and takes
no view as to the normative desirability of deportation as such.
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way the deportation regime has been functioning on the ground.
Under the status quo, energetic sub-federal subversion of federal
policy makes it very difficult for federal authorities to actualize a
regime based on their own unilaterally set priorities. States and
localities are able to push for the deportation of individuals the
federal government would not have pursued, or to obstruct federal
authorities in pursuing those they have pursued. Crucially, however,
sub-federal actors are not able to exert meaningful influence over the
setting of priorities, the task that they are best equipped to take on.
Thus, this Article suggests opening alternative avenues for sub-federal
participation in priority-setting.
II. THE OPTIMAL DEPORTATION REGIME
This Part sets out a conception of an optimal deportation regime
through the lens of its two dominant functions. It demonstrates that
such a regime would be characterized by under-enforcement and
priority-driven allocation of resources.
It then proceeds to
characterize the relevant costs and benefits that should inform
priority-setting. Given the character and the distribution of the direct
and indirect costs of deportation, the federal government is better
situated to determine the answer to the first question defining the
deportation regime—the “how many” question—while sub-federal
governments are better situated to inform the answer to the second
question of what types should be prioritized for deportation.
A. Functions of the Deportation Regime and Underenforcement
The deportation regime encompasses the detection and
investigation of deportable non-citizens, their apprehension, their
civil prosecution in an immigration court or other legal processing of
their case, and their actual deportation out of the country.
Deportation is not the only sanction that enforces the immigration
laws, but it is an essential one, and one that is unique to immigration
18
law. As one of the mechanisms for enforcement of the immigration
18

To be sure, deportation is not the only mechanism that enforces immigration
laws: employer sanctions, border enforcement, and criminal prosecution, among
others, also enforce the immigration laws. The present discussion does not take into
account the possibility that these other mechanisms might beneficially supplant or
augment deportation. Thinking about the immigration enforcement regime as a
whole would certainly call for such consideration. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits
of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 68 (2009) (explaining
that immigration enforcement entails answering a large number of questions, such as
“should we beef up enforcement? If so, should we concentrate our resources at the
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laws, the deportation regime may be seen through two lenses: as a
screening mechanism, which is intended to advance the substantive
purposes of the immigration regime, and as a penalty for the
violations of the law, which vindicates the intrinsic rule-of-law values
harmed by such violations. Although, at some level of abstraction,
these two functions of deportation are conceptually distinct—the first
aimed at selecting people who are not wanted as part of the national
community, and the second aimed at penalizing violations of laws—
they are not mutually exclusive.
And as argued here, both
perspectives lead to harmonious conclusions as to the characteristics
of an optimal deportation regime.
The substantive purposes of the immigration regime encompass
the reasons the United States, or any sovereign state, allows any inmigration at all. Immigration of non-citizens may serve valuable
economic purposes, such as filling labor needs and increasing
economic productivity.
Immigration may rectify demographic
imbalances, by, for example, introducing young people into an aging
community. Immigration may reunite families and contribute to
cultural diversity. And of course, immigration may serve purely
political or expressive functions: taking in refugees, for example,
expresses and affirms a nation’s humanitarian values and signals
disapproval of certain political regimes.
To the extent that
immigration is welcomed at all, it is because in some relevant sense it
is seen to augment the well-being of the host society.
Allowing non-citizens into the country is not costless. Too much
immigration and/or the wrong types of immigrants may harm,
rather than augment, the well-being of the host society: it may cause
economic harm, destabilize the social fabric, or present risks to
national security. Thus, every sovereign state exerts some control
over who may enter its borders and on what terms they may remain.
Adam Cox and Eric Posner helpfully described these substantive
goals of the immigration regime as entailing “first-order issues,” or
preferences as to how many and what types of people we want to
19
admit and under what conditions. At least in the abstract, there is
some number and some types of immigrants that would best further
those goals, while minimizing the costs.
border, in the interior, or both? Should we prioritize deportations, criminal
prosecutions, or both? Should we strengthen the employer sanctions regime? . . .
[S]hould we offer legal status to . . . the undocumented population and, if so, under
what conditions?”).
19
Adam Cox & Eric Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 (2007).
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The decisions regarding the number and types of immigrants
that are formalized in admissions criteria are “second-order choices,”
20
which seek to implement first-order preferences. Legal admissions
criteria attempt to strike a favorable balance between the advantages
of immigration and its costs by “screen[ing] applicants for admission
21
so that the desired types are admitted and others are excluded.”
The American immigration system largely relies on numerical limits
to determine how many and which of the potential incomers are in
fact allowed in. It would be nothing short of a miracle if statutory
limits, notoriously slow and difficult to change, were to correspond to
the levels and kind of immigration that would best advance the aims
that justify immigration. There is no reason to suppose, then, that
the distinction between legal and extralegal flows tracks the
distinction between advantageous and harmful immigration. Most
empirical scholarship does not distinguish between the effects of
legal or extralegal arrivals on host societies, precisely on the
presumption that the difference is merely legal and has no bearing
22
on the extralegal effects of migration. One need not believe that all
extralegal migration is socially desirable to be convinced that at least
23
some part of it may enhance the welfare of the recipient population.
Because the presence of unauthorized migrants signals the
inadequacy of legal admissions, the problem it presents is not merely
one of punishing widespread violations of the law. Unauthorized
immigration also presents another, ex ante screening opportunity to
implement first-order preferences. In this light, the mass presence of
unauthorized migrants in the country is no cause for regret. As Cox
20

Id.
Id.
22
See, e.g., GORDON HANSON, The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, 26 Council
Special Report (Apr. 14, 2007) (“[T]here is little evidence that legal immigration is
economically
preferable
to
illegal
immigration.”),
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/immigration/economic-logic-illegal-immigration/p12969.
23
See, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, The Removal of Irregular Migrants in Europe and
America 4 (Washington Univ. in St. Louis School of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 11-10-03, 2011) (“[T]he level of non-compliance is evidence that the law
itself is insufficiently accommodating the relevant competing interests.”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1945833.
For arguments
regarding the economic efficiency of illegal migration, see, Hanson, supra note 22
(“[I]llegal immigration more readily responds to market forces than legal
immigration.”); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PENN. L. REV. 1147 (1997) (applying
trade principles to immigration and concluding that liberalizing the immigration
regime by, inter alia, eliminating quantitative immigration barriers, would enhance
the national economic welfare as well as global economic welfare).
21
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and Posner point out, ex post screening via deportation has an
important informational advantage over ex ante screening via the
admissions regime because more is known about the potential
24
deportees than was the case before they entered the country. If we
focus on the screening function, it is virtually axiomatic that not all
deportable persons should be deported. To say that the deportation
regime serves a screening function is not merely an academic idiom.
Surveying the case law as well as statutory evolution, Stephen
Legomsky and Cristina Rodriguez note that the deportation regime
cannot be realistically described as simply a corrective for “admissions
25
errors” or penalties for “violations of conditions imposed on entry.”
Instead, as the Supreme Court put it in 1924, the function of
deportation is “to rid the country of persons who had shown by their
career that their continued presence here would not make for the
safety or welfare of society,” and implicitly, to show forbearance
towards those, whose continued presence would enhance such
26
welfare.
The view of deportation as a screening mechanism is not at odds
with the view of it as a system of penalties for violations of the law.
Even if a migrant otherwise contributes to the public welfare, the fact
of his violation of the immigration laws undermines the rule of law
27
and makes him a less socially desirable type. The societal interest in
maintaining the rule of law, however, is just one among many
competing interests that migration implicates. Even if we elevate the
intrinsic value of the law over all extrinsic social purposes migration
serves, it would still not be optimal to seek deportation of all the
violators. That is for the familiar reasons that make it undesirable to
attempt total eradication of violations, rooted in both efficiency and
28
normative considerations.
24

See Cox & Posner, supra note 19.
STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 518 (2009).
26
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).
27
That proposition itself is contestable because violations of immigration law are
not universally treated as violations of mala in se prohibitions. See, e.g., Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2039 (2008) (“Is
immigration outside the law a matter of egregious lawbreaking, or does it represent
an invited contribution to the U.S. economy and society that the government
tolerates?”).
28
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts
That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (1992) (showing that even
when society would wish to deter all violations of some type, because they are
undesirable in themselves, “the benefits from deterrence often will be insufficient to
25
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In this light, the problem of deportation is no different from any
problem of optimal enforcement: socially optimal enforcement calls
for deportation until marginal costs of an additional deportation
equal its marginal benefits. The social desirability of a particular
migrant bears on the costs and benefits of deporting that migrant,
and the full cost of deportation may outweigh the rule-of-law benefits
thereof. As elaborated in the next section, screening to distinguish
the more socially desired types from the undesirable types, and
assessing the costs and benefits of deportation to optimally enforce
29
the immigration laws are the same problem, not two separate ones.
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law institutionalizes
the recognition that forbearance from enforcement of the law, even
against clear violators, will often be preferable to attempts at its
30
enforcement. Similar to criminal law enforcement, the executive’s
discretion in immigration enforcement is justified by the need to
allocate scarce resources and by the need to ensure that the sanction

justify the expenditures on enforcement that would be required to deter everyone”),
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01448188/12/1; STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 488, 486 (2004) (explaining
that “optimal law enforcement is characterized by underdeterrence—and perhaps
substantial underdeterrence—due to the costliness of enforcement effort and limits
on sanctions” and not due to the “social desirab[ility]” of the illegal act; indeed,
“because of the costs of enforcement, it is possible that it will be optimal for there
not to be any law enforcement, for society to countenance the harm in order to save
the costs of law enforcement altogether”).
29
It is worth noting that the majority of the American public has never favored
total deportation of all deportable individuals. Consider the answers to the following
Gallup poll question: “Which comes closest to your view about what government
policy should be toward illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States?
Should the government: (1) deport all illegal immigrants back to their home
country; (2) allow illegal immigrants to remain in the United States in order to work,
but only for a limited amount of time; or (3) allow illegal immigrants to remain in
the United States and become U.S. citizens, but only if they meet certain
requirements
over
a
period
of
time?”
Immigration,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx/#2 (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
Deport All Remain in the U.S. to Work Remain and Become a Citizen
2011 Jun 9-12

21%

13%

64%

2007 Mar 2-4

24%

15%

59%

2006 Jun 8-25

16%

17%

66%

30

See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“A principal
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials.”); Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 823 n.3 (2009) (“Congress
legislates against a background assumption of prosecutorial discretion.”).
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does not wholly frustrate the extrinsic purposes of the law. In both
cases, we rely on the executive not to enforce laws against targets
whose prosecution does not further the substantive goals of the
32
relevant legal regime.
B. Deciding Whom to Deport
1. The Costs and Benefits of Deportation
How should scarce resources be allocated to best serve both the
screening function and the law enforcement function? How do we
determine which types of migrants are socially undesirable, and with
respect to whom the benefits of deportation are likely to exceed the
costs? To answer these questions, it is useful to distinguish between
the direct and indirect consequences (i.e., costs and benefits) of
deportation. The direct cost of a deportation is its administrative cost,
or the resources necessary to identify, apprehend, process, and
actually remove a deportable person.
The direct benefit of a
deportation is the vindication of the rule of law. These costs and
benefits are direct because they are invariably present for every
potential deportation. Let us presume for the moment that the
deportable population is homogeneous with respect to these costs
and benefits: that is, the administrative costs of deporting any one
migrant are equivalent to those of deporting another, and the rule-oflaw benefit from penalizing one violation is equivalent to penalizing
another. Assuming this kind of homogeneity, the cost and benefit
curves would look the same as they do in the context of criminal law:
the marginal cost of enforcement rises and the marginal benefits
31

See, e.g., Declaration of Daniel H. Ragsdale, Appendix B, at ¶ 28, Georgia
Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(declaring that “ICE does not seek to arrest, detain, remove, or refer for prosecution,
all aliens who may be present in the United States illegally,” and exercises its
discretion to “focus[] its enforcement efforts in a manner that is intended to most
effectively further national security, public safety, and security of the border, and has
affirmative reasons not to seek removal or prosecution of certain aliens”).
32
See, e.g., Hedder v Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision
not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process is a decision
generally committed to any agency’s absolute discretion.”). For these reasons, legal
actions to compel enforcement of immigration laws fare no better than legal actions
to compel criminal investigation or prosecution: all such suits were dismissed. See
Huntington, supra note 13, at 789 n.42 (discussing the cases). For a discussion of the
reasons the police and prosecutors have no general duty to investigate and prosecute
crimes, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (upholding “passive
enforcement policy” that resulted in 16 prosecutions out of an estimated 674,000
violators of a federal criminal law against an impermissible “selective prosecution”
challenge).
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decline with each additional deportation, for the same reasons that
apply to modeling the costs and benefits of criminal law
enforcement. If the direct costs and benefits were the only relevant
ones, and if we presumed a homogeneous migrant population, then
the optimal enforcement level would be specified simply as a number
of deportations.
But the deportable population is not fully homogeneous with
respect to those costs and benefits. And importantly, the direct costs
and benefits are not the ones most strongly influencing people’s
preferences about how to enforce immigration laws. The most
profound disagreements about immigration enforcement stem
primarily from disagreements over the relatively indirect
consequences of deportation weighed against those of tolerating
unauthorized migrant presence.
People oppose, welcome, or
tolerate unauthorized migration for reasons apart from its illegality.
These reasons stem from beliefs about the consequences of
unauthorized migrant presence, or of immigration generally.
The indirect consequences embrace the varied economic, social,
demographic, and other effects that might accompany the choice to
deport or forbear from deportation of violators. The benefits of
deportation are often treated as simply the mirror image of the costs
of unauthorized presence, and vice versa. That is, if unauthorized
migrants are deemed to contribute to particular outcomes, desirable
33
or not, deporting them would make those outcomes less likely.
These may be thought of as indirect costs and benefits of deportation
because they do not inescapably accompany the removal of one or
many people, but constitute more attenuated, speculative, and thus,
contested phenomena. With respect to such indirect consequences
of enforcement choices, the migrant population is heterogeneous.
That migrants are heterogeneous in this regard is intuitive at the
individual level. All else being equal, the deportation of a violent
felon with no community ties would be universally preferred to the
deportation of an otherwise law-abiding long-term resident, who fell
34
out of status and has extensive ties to the community. Although
33

This, of course, may not be entirely true: it is possible, e.g., that immigration
adversely affects the labor outcomes of some native workers, but that deporting
unauthorized workers does not improve the situation of the affected natives.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of analytic simplicity here, I refer to the impact of
deportation and the impact of unauthorized migrant presence interchangeably,
unless explicitly distinguished.
34
See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (observing that “workers trying to
support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or
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deporting the felon and the long-term resident entails comparable
administrative costs and rule-of-law benefits, targeting the former also
carries the benefit of removing a criminal offender from the
community, potentially deterring other deportable individuals from
committing crimes. Targeting the latter, on the other hand, creates
no such additional benefits and may impose additional costs on the
community in which the long-term resident is embedded. Because
migrants are heterogeneous with respect to the indirect
consequences of their removal, the optimal deportation regime
cannot be specified completely by reference to the desired level or
35
number of deportees. Because the deportation of the felon confers
a higher net benefit than the deportation of the long-term resident, it
is not a matter of indifference which migrants are selected for
deportation.
To say, as Borjas does, that the “American people care about
36
who the immigrants are,” is to assert precisely this: people feel
differently about different types of immigrants because they perceive
that some types impose net costs, while others confer net benefits.
The most recent generation of empirical research supports Borjas’s
assertion, demonstrating that public attitudes towards immigrants are
37
conditional on the characteristics of the immigrants in question.
Particular types of immigrants are welcomed or not depending on
whether they contribute to the consequences of immigrant presence
that are of gravest concern. An optimal deportation system would
thus prioritize the individuals whose deportation would yield the
highest net benefits (i.e., the less socially desired types), while
forbearing from targeting those whose deportation would impose net
costs (i.e., the more socially desired types). The notion that
identifiable “types” may actually be arranged from least to most

aliens who commit a serious crime,” and thus, the latter should be prioritized for
deportation).
35
But see Schuck, supra note 10, at 72 (“[O]nce the government has settled on an
appropriate enforcement level, society has a compelling interest in seeing that the
enforcement is carried out effectively at that level.”) (emphasis added).
36
Borjas, supra note 1, 4–5.
37
See Jens Hainmueller & Daniel J. Hopkins The Hidden American Immigration
Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Massachusetts Inst. of
Tech., Pol. Sci. Dep’t Working Paper No. 22, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2106116; Jens Hainmueller &
Michael J. Hiscox, Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence
from a Survey Experiment, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (2010); G. H. Hanson et al., Public
Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization Strategies, 19 ECON. & POL. 33
(2007).
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desirable is, of course, an abstraction. But it is a useful abstraction if
the deportation regime is to serve its purpose as a screening
mechanism that selects people for deportation on the basis of how
socially desirable their presence is.
It is a useful abstraction, too, if we focus on the law enforcement
function. A priority-based deportation regime is optimal whether
one is concerned with deterrence of violations or the just penalty for
the violation. With respect to deterrence, the analogy with the
criminal law enforcement system remains applicable. For the
purposes of general, rather than specific deterrence, the optimal
sanction should increase with the severity of the harm from the illegal
38
act. If enforcement of immigration laws via deportation has any
39
deterrent effects, it is preferable to target resources to deter those
types, whose violations cause the greatest harm. In this regard, the
immigration law enforcement problem may be conceptually harder
than the criminal law enforcement problem because the social harm
of crimes is usually readily identifiable and tied to the unlawful act
(e.g., social harm of murder is the death of a human being). This is
not so with immigration law violations.
The social harm of
immigration violations is rarely thought to inhere in the discrete act
or omission that violated the law (e.g., unlawful entry, overstaying a
visa) or its immediate consequences; rather, it is understood in terms
of unlawful presence that ensues after the violation is committed.
What makes an individual’s continuing presence costly or beneficial
are characteristics and circumstances that are largely exogenous to
the legal status itself. An enforcement regime that succeeds in
38

See Shavell, supra note 28, at 518–19, 525 (addressing marginal deterrence and
general deterrence); Steven Shavell, Specific versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J.
POL. ECON. 1088 (1991), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell
/pdf/99_J_Political_Econ_1088.pdf; Dilip Mookherjee & I. P. L. Png, Monitoring visa-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 556 (1992), available at
http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r20310/eco8510/Mookherjee-Png_AER1992.pdf.
39
This proposition is itself contested. See, e.g., Wayne A. Cornelius & Idean
Salehyan, Does Border Enforcement Deter Unauthorized Immigration? The Case of Mexican
Migration to the United States of America, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 139, 140 (2007) (finding
that “tougher border controls have had remarkably little influence on the propensity
of Mexican nationals to migrate illegally to the USA,” and noting that the finding is
in harmony with other recent empirical studies on enforcement effects); see also infra
note 214. At the same time, there is some evidence that deportation has selection
effects as to types of immigrants, and a deterrent effect on post-entry conduct. See
Kristin F. Butcher & Anne M. Piehl, Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates so Low?
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, WP-05-19, 2005) (showing that a broadening of the set of crimes that
trigger deportation in the U.S. in the 1990s affected both the type of immigrants and
their behavior once in the country).
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marginally deterring violations that create greater social costs must
prioritize enforcement against types that impose such costs. Unlike
criminal law, immigration law enforcement cannot shape violators’
incentives by calibrating the magnitude of the sanction to the severity
40
of the violation. Calibrating the probability of the sanction is the
only tool available with which to affect incentives of immigration law
41
violators.
Prioritizing certain types, therefore, means simply that
more resources ought to be allocated to their apprehension and
removal, raising the probability of the sanction relative to nonpriority types.
A priority-based deportation regime remains optimal even if the
deterrence value is discounted and the focus is instead on delivering
a just or fitting sanction for the violation of the law. Several scholars
have criticized relatively indiscriminate enforcement by appealing to
42
principles of proportionality. Indeed, some scholars have argued
that since many of the grounds for deportation involve post-entry
criminal behavior, deportation is in part a punitive measure, which is
43
subject to constitutional proportionality principles.
Thus, if
removing certain types of persons is grossly disproportionate to their
offense, it is at least unjustifiable to deploy scarce resources on their
deportation.
2. The Indirect Consequences of Deportation
That the optimal deportation regime should be priority-based is
not a logically challenging proposition. The more complex question

40

This is a simplification of reality that does not alter the main point: a person
ordered removed may be precluded from returning to the United States for a period
of 5, 10 or 20 years—or ever—depending on the grounds for his removal. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), (ii)(II) (2012). However, the length of the bar on return
presents a very limited opportunity to calibrate sanctions, since in no event is legal
return probable or likely.
41
To be sure, immigration violators are not immune to ordinary criminal law,
which should deter unauthorized immigrants from committing crimes. Indeed,
there is some empirical evidence for these kinds of deterrence effects on immigrants’
post-entry behaviors. See generally Butcher & Piehl, supra note 39.
42
See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732
(2009) (“[A]ssigning deportation as the ubiquitous sanction renders it impossible to
calibrate the gravity of the violation with the size of the sanction.”).
43
See, e.g., Michael Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S.
Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011); Angela M. Banks, Proportional
Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1656 (2009) (“[T]he key question in determining
whether or not a sanction is punishment is not whether it is criminal or civil, but
whether it is remedial or punitive,” because “[p]unitive measures in both contexts
are subject to constitutional limitations.”).
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concerns how those priorities should be determined. As suggested
above, Americans are not indifferent to the characteristics of
deportees. Attitudes towards particular migrant types are likely to be
informed by perceptions about the consequences of migration, which
are inextricably linked to expectations about consequences of
deportation. For example, if unauthorized immigrants impose an
onerous tax burden by educating their children in public schools,
and the community is seriously concerned about this particular effect
of immigration, that community might prioritize deportation of
families with school-aged children—or, for that matter, the children
44
themselves—over the deportation of childless adults. Building on
that intuition, this section examines just a few of the potential
consequences of migrant presence, and speculates about how these
consequences might shape societal preferences for targeting
particular migrant types for deportation (as opposed to preferences
regarding immigration enforcement levels).
In particular, this
discussion suggests that the indirect consequences of migration are
not uniform across the country. If societal determinations of more
and less desirable types are linked to the variable consequences that
migration produces, then considerable difficulty besets any attempt
to create uniform nationwide priorities in a large and heterogeneous
nation.
i. The Uneven Spatial Impact of Migrant Presence
Consider the most prominent consideration in public discourse
regarding immigration, its economic impact. Classical economic
theory, which does not distinguish between legal and illegal
migration, predicts that migration increases the overall economic
productivity of the host nation, but will have redistributive
consequences including adverse impacts on wages and employment
45
of some subset of native labor.
In particular, immigration is
expected to lower the wages of competing native workers, but raise

44

Deporting unaccompanied children is not just a fanciful hypothetical. See
Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegalimmigrants-face-deportation.html?pagewanted=all.
45
See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Immigration Restriction as Redistributive Taxation:
Working Women and the Costs of Protectionism in the Labor Market, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1,
7 (2009); TIMOTHY J. HATTON & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBAL MIGRATION AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY: TWO CENTURIES OF POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 290 (2005); Hanson,
supra note 22; Borjas, supra note 1, at 10, 12.
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46

the wages of complementary workers. And there is evidence that
47
the hypothesized impact occurs. The concern for the impact of
immigration on native workers is already formalized in admissions
criteria: applicants for certain employment-based visas need to show
that their employment will not adversely impact the employment of
48
U.S. workers. These same considerations may inform priorities for
deportation. In that regard, the prevailing economic wisdom is that
low-skilled immigrants impose a greater net cost on the economy
than high-skilled migrants because unskilled migrants do not
complement the native labor needs, and therefore, produce a smaller
49
immigrant surplus.
Thus, insofar as economic consequences of
migrant presence may bear on deportation priorities, unskilled
50
migrants might be prioritized over the more skilled.
Consider next the fiscal impact of unauthorized migration.
Unauthorized immigrants consume public goods, but they also
contribute to tax revenue. Most estimates of the aggregate, national
fiscal impact of immigration conclude that, over the long term, tax
revenues generated by immigrants, both legal and unauthorized,
51
exceed the cost of the services they use. But, in the short term, the
46

GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION AND THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. LABOR MARKET
(1960-2000), DEP’T OF LABOR, ETA OCCASIONAL PAPER 2005–10, at 9 (2005).
47
See, e.g., id. at 13 (“[A]n immigration-induced 10 percent increase in the
number of workers in each skill group . . . reduces the wage of native workers in that
same skill group by 3.5 percent; it reduces the wage of native workers who have the
same education but who differ in their experience by 0.7 percent; and it increases
the wage of native workers with different educational attainment by 0.5 percent.”).
48
For employment based immigration, an immigrant must obtain from the
Department of Labor a certification that (a) the job he proposes to take is one for
which not enough qualified U.S. workers are available and (b) the immigrant’s
employment will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the U.S.
workers. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (2013).
49
See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 22, at 21; Borjas’s, supra note 46, at 13. But see
Gianmarco Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on Wages
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12497, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12497
(identifying
potentially
problematic
assumptions behind Borjas’ methods of estimating wage impact); Chang, supra note
45 (same).
50
This is not to imply that targeting unskilled migrants for deportation is a
normatively or practically justifiable way to deal with the potentially differential
impact of the skilled and unskilled workers on the U.S. economy. For the purposes
of this discussion, this Article ignores all other remedies.
But alternative
enforcement mechanisms do exist. See supra note 18. These may be preferable to
deportation for some subset of violations. For an argument that taxation is preferable
to reducing the numbers of the low-skill workers—whether by deportation or
restrictive admission, see Chang, supra note 45.
51
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE
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fiscal burden of migrants may be a concern. The concern about the
fiscal impact is also formalized in the ex ante admissions criteria, as
the INA prohibits the entry of aliens if they are “likely at any time to
52
become a public charge.” Addressing the same concerns, the
PRWORA authorizes the states to deny or grant welfare benefits to
53
immigrants, lawful and unlawful. These concerns are also manifest
in public opinion, with individuals who are more exposed to the
public-finance consequences of immigration expressing more
54
negative attitudes towards it. Fiscal impact considerations also lead
to the conclusion that unskilled, low-paid, or unemployed workers
might be prioritized for deportation as they pay less in taxes, and
55
perhaps, consume more in public goods than others.
Prioritizing low- or unskilled migrants for deportation over the
highly skilled as a nation-wide policy would produce a certain
geography of enforcement. The skill levels of migrants vary across
the country, and if this societal preference were to guide policy, more
enforcement resources would be directed to areas with higher
concentrations of lower-skilled migrants. So, for example, such a
priority system might concentrate more enforcement resources on a
state like California, where 37.2% of immigrants (legal and illegal)
lacked a high school diploma in 2010, and fewer resources on a state
like New Jersey, where that figure is 20.6%. In both states, the native
population without a high school diploma—the population likely to
be most disadvantaged on the labor market by migrant labor—is
56
comparable, at 8.9% and 8.8%, respectively.
Focusing on national economic or fiscal impact, however,
obscures a great deal of variability across the nation’s territory. It is
not merely the characteristics of migrants that vary—for example,

BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2007).
52
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2012).
53
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
54
See GORDON HANSON, WHY DOES IMMIGRATION DIVIDE AMERICA?: PUBLIC FINANCE
AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO OPEN BORDERS, Ch. 4 (2005).
55
A societal preference for higher skilled migrants over lower skilled ones is not
merely a hypothetical one, with experimental survey evidence showing that people
prefer highly skilled immigrants. See Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra note 37.
56
See MIGRATION POLICY INST., American Community Survey and Census Data on the
Foreign Born by State (2011), http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub
/acscensus.cfm#. Comparable data is not available specifically for the unauthorized
or deportable population by state; for the present purposes, we may assume that the
educational attainment of all immigrants is correlated with that of the unauthorized
population.
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California’s immigrants are generally less educated than New
Jersey’s—but the very impact of migrants on the labor market itself. At
the sub-national level, there are well-designed studies that come to
different conclusions regarding the effects on labor markets. Borjas’
analysis of Arizona, for instance, supports the notion that low-skilled
migrants depress the wages and increase unemployment of native,
57
low-skilled workers. By contrast, studying California’s experience
between 1960 and 2004, Giovanni Peri found that “immigration has a
positive effect on each single education group of native workers,”
with “[e]ven the least educated native workers gain[ing] 1.8% of
58
their real wages and college dropouts gain[ing] 7.2%.”
These
results, Peri argues, put in doubt the view that low-skilled migrants
always impose an economic burden on natives: “If immigration harms
the labor opportunities of natives, especially the least skilled ones,”
then California, with its comparatively less educated migrant labor
force, “was the place where these effects should have been
59
particularly strong.”
These studies are illuminating not so much for the specific
findings they present as for what they imply for deportation policy.
There are several reasons why findings regarding the impact of
migration on any outcome of interest diverge. In part, this is due to
different methodological choices and assumptions underlying the
60
analyses. But in part, it is also because the impact of migration
57

See Joint Appendix, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 2012 WL 406205, at
*36–37 (Feb. 6, 2012) (reporting findings that “unauthorized aliens in the Arizona
workforce reduced the earnings of low-skilled authorized workers in Arizona by
4.7%,” and “increased their unemployment rate by 1.4[%]”).
58
GIOVANNI PERI, IMMIGRANTS’ COMPLEMENTARITIES AND NATIVE WAGES: EVIDENCE
FROM CALIFORNIA 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12956,
2007).
59
Id. at 1; see also DAVID CARD, CTR. FOR RESEARCH & ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION, HOW
IMMIGRATION AFFECTS U.S. CITIES, DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 11/07 (2007) (finding
that “immigration exerts a modestly positive effect on the labor market outcomes of
most natives” across 17 metropolitan areas); David Card, The Impact of the Mariel
Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245 (1990) (finding that
the 1980 arrival of 125,000 Mariel Cubans in Miami, which suddenly increased the
local labor supply by 7%, had no discernible effects on native wages or employment).
60
See, e.g., Borjas, supra note 46, at 10 (arguing that the numerous cross-sectional
studies, which converged towards a finding of no effect on natives’ wages, were
contrary to his results, in part because of immigrant clustering in cities with thriving
economies—and thus, high wages—and in part because of the natives’ own outmigration in response to migrant labor competition); Ottaviano & Peri, supra note 49
(arguing that Borjas’s nation-level findings diverge from their own because he
assumes that the supply of capital is fixed and that equally educated migrants and
natives are perfect substitutes, and that these assumptions may not be justified).

TREYGER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE DEPORTATION CONUNDRUM

1/10/2014 3:46 PM

127

actually differs from place to place, from one time period to another,
and from short-run to long-run. Indeed, economic theory identifies
the reasons why we should expect differential impact: the effect on
the labor market depends on the extent to which migrant labor is a
close substitute for native labor, the mobility of native labor, and the
61
mobility of capital, among other factors. It would be reasonable for
some jurisdictions to conclude that the impact on the native labor
market has been adverse, while others conclude that the impact in
their communities has been positive.
This implies that any
nationwide priorities we might derive from the adverse impact of
migrants on the labor market may not accurately capture the types
that impose the greatest costs on the native community. While the
deportation of a sufficient number of unskilled unauthorized
migrants may alleviate the pressures on the natives’ employment
prospects in Arizona (if we believe Borjas), the same results are not
likely to follow in California (if we believe Peri).
Likewise, the fiscal impact of migrants is uneven. While most
estimates of the national fiscal impact of immigration conclude that
even unauthorized immigrants generate more revenue than they
consume in public services, the same is usually not the case at the
state and local levels, especially in the short run. Because fiscal
benefits accrue primarily to the federal government and the costs are
borne disproportionately by state and local governments, at the sub62
federal level, the net fiscal impact on the latter is often negative. At
61

See GEORGE J. BORJAS ET AL., SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS, NATIVES, AND
SKILL GROUPS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17461, 2011)
(explaining that “the wage impact of immigration depends crucially on the elasticity
of substitution between similarly skilled immigrants and natives and the elasticity of
substitution between high school dropouts and graduates,” and that different
estimates of these elasticities explain divergent findings); Chang, supra note 45, at 9
(noting that “the demand for labor does not remain fixed when immigrants enter
the economy,” and that adjustments in demand will condition the impact).
62
See HANSON, supra note 54, at 42. This is so for a number of reasons. First,
“most unauthorized immigrants are prohibited from receiving many of the benefits
that the federal government provides through Social Security and such need-based
programs,” but state and local governments are required to provide certain services,
in order to participate in some federal assistance programs. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 51, at 1. Courts have also restricted the authority of state and local
governments to deny certain public services to unauthorized immigrants. See, e.g.,
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(striking down California’s Proposition 187, which would have eliminated access for
unauthorized immigrants to almost all public services). Second, “[i]n general, state
and local governments bear much of the cost of providing certain public services—
especially services related to education, health care, and law enforcement—to
individuals residing in their jurisdictions.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 1.
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the same time, the fiscal burden on sub-federal governments is
variable, and this variability is not wholly a function of the size of the
unauthorized immigrant population or of different methodological
63
approaches to its calculation.
As a Congressional Budget Office
review of numerous state-level fiscal-impact studies found, “the
64
impact in one jurisdiction cannot be generalized to other areas.”
This is not surprising as states and localities differ greatly in the types
of benefits they provide, the eligibility rules for the benefits, and the
65
structure of their tax revenue. Some jurisdictions spend more on
educating unauthorized children than others; some spend more on
incarcerating unauthorized migrants than others; some spend more
66
on health care provisions than others.
For example, Colorado
estimated that it spent 1.7 times as much on providing medical care
67
for unauthorized migrants as it did on incarcerating them in 2006.
By contrast, Texas estimated that it spent more than twice as much on
incarcerating unauthorized immigrants as it did on their medical
68
care in 2006. Because of such differences, as well as differences in
On the benefit side, by contrast, unauthorized migrants provide more federal tax
revenue (from Social Security and federal income taxes) relative to state or local tax
revenue.
63
Although such differences certainly matter, see WILLIAM K. JAEGER, POTENTIAL
ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN OREGON OF IMPLEMENTING PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY “NO MATCH” IMMIGRATION RULES, 35 (2008), available at
http://immigrationworksusa.org/uploaded/file
/CWO%20Economic%20Study%20-%20OSU%20-%20Jaeger.pdf
(demonstrating
inconsistent results of fiscal impact of the exodus of the entire unauthorized worker
population “appear to be due to the distinction between a static analysis (estimated
current tax contributions of undocumented immigrants) and a dynamic analysis
(estimated change in revenues if undocumented immigrants departed)”).
64
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 5.
65
For a discussion of representative studies of fiscal impact, see JAEGER, supra
note 63, at 9 (discussing results of studies from Colorado, Missouri, and Texas);
National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/immig/state-studies-on-fiscal-impacts.aspx (summarizing findings of many
state-level fiscal impact studies).
66
E.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 8 (noting that Minnesota
estimates that it spent about $8,400 per child to educate unauthorized immigrant
children in 2003–04, while New Mexico estimates that number for the same year to
be
around
$7,280
per
head);
OFFICE
OF
JUSTICE
PROGRAMS,
https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=86 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013)
(noting that Texas pays $12,000 per inmate to incarcerate criminal aliens, while
California pays $34,000 for the same).
67
RICH JONES & ROBIN BAKER, COSTS OF FEDERALLY MANDATED SERVICES TO
UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS
IN
COLORADO
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.bellpolicy.org/PUBS/IssBrf/2006/06ImmigCosts.pdf (expenditures of
$31.3 million and $18 million, respectively).
68
See CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, TEXAS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER,
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tax revenue, the characteristics of the greatest-public-goods consumer
may differ from state to state.
Consider now the perceived consequences of unauthorized
migration for crime. States and localities that adopt restrictionist
measures often point to the crimes committed by migrants as one of
69
the justifications for the measures. Unlike concerns about the labor
market and public expenditures, for which there is theoretical and
some empirical support, the weight of empirical research indicates
that late twentieth-century immigrants are less likely to commit
70
crimes than the native born, and that higher concentrations of
immigrants at the aggregate level do not correlate with higher crime
71
rates. This is the case for immigrants in general and unauthorized
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO THE
STATE
BUDGET
AND
ECONOMY
1,
9,
14
(2006),
available
at
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/undocumented/undocumented.pdf
(expenditures of $130.6 million and $58 million, respectively).
69
See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 § 2 (Sept. 21, 2006) (finding that
“[i]llegal immigration leads to higher crime rates”); Proposition 187 §1, 1994 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (Nov. 8, 1994) (overturned by a federal court) (claiming
“[t]he people of California . . . have suffered and are suffering economic hardship
caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state,” and “personal injury and
damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state”) (quoted in
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 787 (C.D. Cal.
1995)). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 507
(2007) (describing the common perception that immigration causes crime and
citing studies demonstrating a lack of such a link).
70
In the U.S., the proposition that late twentieth-century immigrants are less
likely to offend than the native-born is very well-supported. See, e.g., Robert J.
Sampson, Op-Ed., Open Doors Don’t Invite Criminals: Is Increased Immigration Behind the
Drop in Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A27 (describing results of a study that
“revealed that Latin American immigrants are less violent and less likely than the
second and third generations to commit crimes even when they live in dense
communities with high rates of poverty”); Ruben G. Rubmaut et al., Debunking the
Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young
Men, Invited Address to the “Immigration Enforcement and Civil Liberties: The Role
of Local Police” National Conference, Police Foundation 2 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1877365 (“[S]tudies, including official crime
statistics and victimization surveys since the early 1990s, data from the last three
decennial censuses, national and regional surveys . . .and investigations carried out
by major government commissions over the past century, have shown . . . that
immigration is associated with lower crime rates . . . .”); Ramiro Martinez, Jr. &
Matthew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, THE
NATURE OF CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 485, 496 (Gary LaFree et al.
eds., 2000) (“The major finding of a century of research on immigration and crime is
that . . . immigrants nearly always exhibit lower crime rates than native groups.”).
71
The question of macro-level impact is more complex and has been the subject
of fewer studies, although most find either a negative or no relationship between
migrant concentration and crime. See, e.g., John M. MacDonald et al., The Effects of

TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE)

130

1/10/2014 3:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:107

72

migrants specifically. But some categories of crime may be potential
byproducts of unauthorized migration: the process of illegal entry
itself, for example, feeds the human trafficking industry. And
because criminal acts are viewed as socially undesirable, it is
reasonable to use criminal activity as a criterion for separating
desirable from undesirable individuals without regard to the macrolevel effects on crime rates.
These concerns, formalized in
admissions criteria, constitute formal deportation grounds, and form
73
the basis for current federal deportation priorities.
The relationship between unauthorized migration and crime
also differs across the country. Contrary to nationwide or crosssectional studies, the experience in specific parts of the country
suggests a higher share of unauthorized migrants among convicted
criminals. Maricopa County, for example, claims that unauthorized
immigrants are overrepresented among the felon population relative
74
to their share of the Arizona population. The threats from crime
Immigrant Concentration on Changes in Neighborhood Crime Rates, 29 J. QUANT. CRIM. 191,
193 (2012) (finding that a higher concentration of immigrants is associated with
“greater than expected reductions” in index and violent crimes across Los Angeles
neighborhoods 2000–05); Lesley Williams Reid et al., The Immigration-Crime
Relationship: Evidence Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 757, 772–74
(2005) (finding that “the greater the relative size of the recent foreign-born
population,” the lower the homicide rate across a representative sample of 150 U.S.
metropolitan areas in 2000); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Cross-city
Evidence on the Relationship Between Immigration and Crime, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
457 (1998) (finding no relationship between the percent of immigrants in the
population and the crime rate across a sample of metropolitan areas between 1980
and 1990).
72
See, e.g., Ruben G. Rumbaut, Undocumented Immigration and Rates of Crime and
Imprisonment: Popular Myths and Empirical Realities, in POLICE FOUNDATION 119, 126,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877365 (finding
that “the lowest incarceration rates among Latin American immigrants are seen for
the least educated groups, who are also the groups who account for the majority of
the undocumented: the Salvadorans[,] Guatemalans[], and the Mexicans”).
73
Criminal activity is a basis for both inadmissibility and a ground of
deportability. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2013) (removal on the basis of
crimes of moral turpitude); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (2013) (removal on the basis
of aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2013) (crime related to highspeed flight from an immigration checkpoint); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2013)
(controlled substance violations). For a discussion of federal priorities, see infra Part
III.A.
74
Joint Appendix, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 2012 WL 406205, at *299
(Feb. 6, 2012) (“Arizona’s population is comprised of approximately 9% illegal
immigrants, yet 21.8% of felonies sentenced in Maricopa County Superior Court are
committed by illegal immigrants.”); Stephen A. Camarota & Jessica M. Vaughan,
Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Issue, BACKGROUNDER (Cent. for
Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2009, at 16 (estimating that
unauthorized aliens comprise 8.9% of the population and are responsible for 21.8%
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connected with unauthorized migration vary across the country: in
particular, border states bear the burden of immigration-related
75
crimes, such as smuggling and human trafficking. Likewise, some
areas struggle with a heavier presence of gangs with large numbers of
76
unauthorized alien members, and other areas do not.
As Peter
Schuck’s synthesis of all available data shows, deportable non-citizens
represent a highly variable share of the incarcerated population, and
the composition of the incarcerated non-citizen population differs
77
across jurisdictions. For jurisdictions with a serious migration-linked
crime problem, targeting criminal aliens above all other types—
perhaps including those who have not committed very serious
crimes—may be justifiable.
By contrast, the arrival of immigrants to some communities has
had salutary effects on public safety and neighborhood social
cohesion. Researchers have argued that the unexpected great
American crime decline of the 1990s is not unrelated to the arrival of
78
Latino and Asian immigrants.
The introduction of these
of the felonies in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix). Such analyses should
be treated with caution, since localities like Maricopa that make aggressive use of
arrests to apprehend immigration violators are likely to disproportionately arrest
members of this group.
75
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 51, at 9 (noting the comparatively
high cost of law enforcement activities in the border counties of California, Arizona,
New Mexico, and Texas); Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Arizona v. United States, No.
11-182, 2012 WL 416748 (Feb. 6, 2012) (documenting the disproportionate burden
on Arizona created by the federal enforcement focus on the California and Texas
borders, resulting in a “funneling of an increasing tide of illegal border crossings
into Arizona,” which are accompanied by “drug and human smuggling”).
76
For example, the notorious gang MS-13 is heavily concentrated in certain
parts of the country. Although the common description of that group as an “alien
gang” is not wholly accurate, see Jennifer Chacon, Whose Community Shield? Examining
the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 327–29
(2007), it certainly has some unauthorized alien involvement. The “18th Street”
association of criminal cliques, with an estimated membership of 30,000 to 50,000,
operates across the country, in at least 44 cities. Only in California, however, are
“approximately 80 percent of the gang’s members . . . illegal aliens from Mexico and
Central America.” NATIONAL GANG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, NATIONAL GANG THREAT
ASSESSMENT, at 23 (2009), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services
/publications/national-gang-threat-assessment-2009-pdf.
77
Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons: Rethinking an
Anachronistic Policy, App’x 1–2 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 266,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805931.
78
See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 70, at A27 (arguing that the drop in crime that
began in the United States in the early 1990s can be partially explained by increases
in immigration).
Systematic longitudinal studies have lent support to this
connection. See, e.g., Jacob I. Stowell et al., Immigration and the Recent Violent Crime
Drop in the United States: A Pooled, Cross-sectional Time-series Analysis of Metropolitan Areas,
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newcomers,
with
their
“tight-knit
families,
economic
entrepreneurship, and collective efficacy,” may help explain why
79
crime declined most steeply in major immigrant destination cities.
Overall, reviews of recent literature have concluded that, “[f]rom the
limited research available, it appears that the concentration of
80
immigration indirectly promotes reductions in crime and violence.”
For jurisdictions where immigrant presence palpably benefits the
host communities in this way, targeting criminal aliens for
deportation is not costless.
The indirect consequences of
deportation in this regard are not simply mirror images of the
consequences of forbearing from deportation. Many researchers—
and police departments themselves—have pointed out that aggressive
immigration enforcement aimed at deportation, especially when
carried out with participation of the local law enforcement agencies
(“LEAs”), also undermines the capacity of the LEAs for crime
81
control. Effective criminal law enforcement relies on the voluntary
82
cooperation of the community with the police, and the fear that
police may be acting as immigration law enforcers makes immigrants
83
less willing to report crimes and cooperate with investigations.
47 CRIMINOLOGY 889, 889 (2009) (finding support for the hypothesis that “the broad
reductions in violent crime during recent years are partially attributable to increases
in immigration”).
79
Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of
Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
489, 492 (2010).
80
David S. Kirk & John H. Laub, Neighborhood Change and Crime in the Modern
Metropolis, 39 CRIME & JUST. 441, 484 (2010); see also Graham C. Ousey & Charis E.
Kubrin, Exploring the Connection Between Immigration and Violent Crime Rates in U.S.
Cities, 1980–2000, 56 SOC. PROBS. 447, 454–65 (2009) (reviewing 11 aggregate-level
quantitative studies on the immigration-crime relationship, and showing that only
two studies find any positive relationship between a subset of immigrants and some
categories of crime).
81
DEBRA A. HOFFMASTER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, POLICE AND
IMMIGRATION: HOW CHIEFS ARE LEADING THEIR COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE
CHALLENGES 43 (2010), available at http://www.policeforum.org/library
/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf.
82
See generally WESLEY SKOGAN & KATHLEEN FRYDL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE (2003); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE (2010).
83
See, e.g., David Kirk et al., The Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigrant
Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety? 641 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 80–81 (2012) (cautioning that “increased and harsh
enforcement of laws may undermine the ability of the police to control crime by
reducing the willingness of immigrants to report crimes and cooperate with the
police in criminal investigations”); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Z.
Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim
Americans, 44 L. & Society Rev. 365 (2010) (offering evidence that the trust required
for cooperation is eroded in presence of (Muslim) immigrants’ fear that any contact
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As Peter Schuck points out, whether the risk of alienating
immigrant communities really compromises the efficacy of crime
84
control depends on the magnitude of that effect at the margin.
Schuck is right that the inferences to be drawn for immigration
enforcement depend on the magnitude of the various effects
attributed to enforcement actions, balancing the gains to crime
control from targeting criminal aliens against the losses due to
community alienation and resource diversion. There is no reason to
suppose that weighing the costs and benefits of deportation for crime
control would yield the same result for every community. Just as
migrant involvement in crime varies across jurisdictions, so too the
85
levels of cooperation with police vary across communities, as does
the impact of law enforcement on the willingness to cooperate and
86
the overall efficacy of crime control.
While in some settings,
targeting even minor criminal violators would reasonably be expected
to lower crime rates, in others, the counter-productive effects of such
targeting would probably overwhelm any boost to public order.
The consideration of the spatially heterogeneous impact of
unauthorized presence on the native labor market, public
expenditures, and crime should convey skepticism about the
possibility of a single optimal priority scheme. Peoples’ preferences
about deportation are likely to be correlated with the consequences
of migrant presence that are most keenly experienced by them. If
social preferences were to be reflected in the identification of the
least and most socially desirable types, the results would unlikely be
with the police may lead to deportation); Hoffmaster, supra note 81, at 4–7
(describing the New Haven PD’s finding that immigrants were more often victims of
crimes than perpetrators, and that diminishing their fears of deportation is far more
helpful to the PD’s crime control efforts than targeting even criminal aliens for arrest
in order to hand them over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E.));
THOMAS M. GUTERBOCK ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CTR. FOR SURVEY
RESEARCH, EVALUATION STUDY OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY’S ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT POLICY 125 (2010), available at http://www.pwcgov.org/government
/bocs/Documents/13188.pdf (finding a substantial drop in Hispanic respondents’
satisfaction with the police in the wake of entering into an immigration enforcement
agreement with the federal government).
84
Schuck, supra note 10, at 72–74.
85
Compare Kirk et al., supra note 83 (demonstrating a high level of cooperation
and trust among non-citizens relative to natives in New York neighborhoods), with
Hoffmaster, supra note 81, xvii (finding that, on the basis of case studies, “in some
communities,” migrants are “reluctant to engage with the police on crime prevention
and community-building,” owing in part to immigrants’ negative experiences with
law enforcement in their own countries).
86
See, e.g., Hoffmaster, supra note 81, xvii (noting that “no two communities are
affected by immigration in the same way”).
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uniform nationally.
3. The Necessity for Subjective Political Judgment
It is not merely the spatially uneven consequences of migration
that make a singular set of nation-wide priorities unlikely to capture
the costs and benefits of migrant presence. Identifying the more and
less desirable types in a given jurisdiction is complicated by the
multiplicity of potential criteria for judging desirability of types, and
by the necessity of subjective, political judgment regarding the tradeoffs. For this reason, the suggestion that the federal government
merely incorporate the variable consequences of migrant presence
87
into enforcement policy would not fully address the problem.
The multiple criteria according to which judgments about the
relative desirability of different types of immigrants might be made
necessitate trade-offs in setting enforcement priorities. Public
debates and research on the consequences of immigration
enforcement and unauthorized migrant presence range widely
beyond the economic, fiscal, and crime impacts discussed above.
Notably, there is a host of concerns about the impact of migrant
presence, or their expulsion, on the social fabric of the community.
Some worry about the possibility that a high concentration of
immigrants undermines social cohesion, and others worry about
damage done by removal of particular individuals on their families
88
and communities.
Some worry about a loss of the American
national culture or identity that accompanies massive changes in the
89
ethno-demographic make-up of the population, and others warn
about the erosion of civil rights and the specter of racial profiling
90
that accompany efforts to rid the country of unauthorized visitors.
87

See Adam Cox & Eric Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1285, 1341 (2012) (addressing that suggestion in passing as a potential way to redress
the old principal-agent problem while retaining federal access to superior sub-federal
information about deportable individuals); Schuck, supra note 77, at 8 (proposing a
reform of legal constraints on early deportations of convicted aliens, and suggesting
that the costs and benefits of such are something only the federal government can
figure out).
88
See, e.g., AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., URBAN INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN
AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at
THE
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture_final.pdf
(examining the consequences of parental detention and deportation on children).
89
See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004).
90
See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004) (“[T]he permanent involvement of
state and local police in routine immigration enforcement raises the further risk of
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Some fear out-migration of the native population will accompany the
arrival of non-citizens, and others predict that only immigrant inmigration can reverse decades of population loss in declining towns
91
and rural areas. The costs and benefits of deportation on the one
hand, and of abiding a large unauthorized migrant presence on the
other, which have been offered up in public discourse and scholarly
debate, are legion.
How much weight to attach to any of the potential consequences
of deporting or forbearing, and whether to consider particular
consequences at all, are not questions that may be reduced to a
solvable optimization problem.
These questions do not lend
themselves to technocratic accounting of quantifiable costs and
benefits. The potential of depressed wages of native workers or the
burdensome education expenditures may carry great weight in a
populous, budget-strapped jurisdiction with high unemployment.
That jurisdiction might target unauthorized workers thought to
contribute to local unemployment or families with school-aged
children. The same costs may not carry so much weight for cities or
towns that are facing long-term economic decline and population
92
loss and looking to immigration to reverse these perilous trends.
Such a jurisdiction may prioritize only the most serious criminals. A
deportation regime attentive to the most serious consequences of
migration where these consequences are most immediately
racial profiling and selective immigration enforcement beyond moments of real or
perceived national threat.”).
91
Patrick J. Carr et al., Immigration and the Changing Social Fabric of American Cities:
Can Immigration Save Small-Town America? Hispanic Boomtowns and the Uneasy Path to
Renewal, 641 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 38; STEVE TOBOCMAN, GLOBAL
DETROIT, SHORT REPORT 2 (2010) (setting out Detroit’s development strategy and
stating that “nothing is more powerful to remaking Detroit as a center of innovation,
entrepreneurship and population growth, than embracing and increasing immigrant
populations and the entrepreneurial culture and global connections that they bring
and deliver,” which “could include both documented and undocumented
residents”), available at http://www.thecenterformichigan.net/wp-content/uploads
/2010/05/GLOBAL_DETROIT.pdf.
92
See Carr et al., supra note 91, at 40–44 (describing the revival of moribund
economies and boost to declining populations delivering by immigration into small
agricultural Midwestern towns); Carol Morello & Luz Lazo, Baltimore Puts Out Welcome
Mat for Immigrants, Hoping to Stop Population Decline, WASH. POST, July 24, 2012,
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com
/2012-07-24/local/35487100_1_immigration-status-immigration-checks-immigrantpopulation (reporting on Baltimore’s policy of attracting immigrants to reverse
decades of population loss even though Baltimore’s unemployment rate is already
high, including the Mayor’s order prohibiting police and social agencies from asking
anyone about immigration status).

TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE)

136

1/10/2014 3:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:107

experienced should accommodate both of those choices.
C. Who Should Decide Whom to Deport?
1. Decentralizing Priority Setting
The character of the costs and benefits of migrant presence and
deportation addressed in the prior section has important
implications for the third question defining the deportation regime:
who should decide how many and which types of immigrants should
be deported? The implications of the costs and benefits of
immigration for “immigration federalism” generally have been noted
in immigration scholarship. The fact that the costs and benefits of
particular enforcement policies are not borne by the same level of
government is often cited as problematic. From this fact, however,
different scholars draw opposing conclusions. Some have criticized
federal exclusivity in the realm of enforcement, as well as other
immigration-related matters, on the grounds that the benefits of
continuing migrant presence (e.g., tax revenue) are federal while
93
costs (e.g., public goods provision) are local. That line of argument
suggests that the federal government would not adequately account
for local costs in choosing immigration enforcement policies, and
thus, states (and localities) should have a greater role in immigration
related matters.
Others have criticized sub-federal participation in immigration
regulation generally, and enforcement in particular, on the grounds
94
that states and localities do not bear the full costs of their policies.
When a jurisdiction adopts aggressive enforcement policies, it
externalizes part of the cost to the federal government and other
jurisdictions: the federal government bears the administrative costs of
processing people who sub-federal authorities insist on placing in
deportation proceedings, and restrictionist policies drive the
95
unauthorized migrants across borders into other jurisdictions. The
93

See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 10, at 70; Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of
Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
459, 460-61 (2008). For a discussion on the asymmetry of fiscal impact, see supra note
65; indeed, in the 1990s, the fiscal asymmetry gave rise to a series of unsuccessful
lawsuits by six states against the federal government, seeking reimbursement, see
Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); California v. United States,
104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997);
New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996); Padavan v. United States, 82
F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995).
94
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9.
95
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1714–19; see also Margaret Hu,
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conclusion that follows from this line of argument is that sub-federal
governments should not engage in any immigration enforcement
(and, according to some, much immigration-related regulation at
96
all).
Though no level of government may be perfectly competent and
properly motivated to enforce the immigration laws, there is room for
improvement over the status quo of de jure federal exclusivity. Given
the character and the distribution of the direct and indirect costs of
deportation, the federal government is better situated to determine
the answer to the first question defining the deportation regime—the
“how many” question—while sub-federal governments are better
situated to inform the answer to the second question of what types
should be prioritized for deportation.
The federal government bears the direct benefits and costs of
deportation. It is the federal government that reaps the direct ruleof-law benefits of deportations because it is violations of federal law
97
that are being sanctioned. More importantly, although state and
local authorities often apprehend immigration violators, by and
large, the federal government bears the enforcement costs for each
person placed in deportation proceedings.
That the federal
government has exclusive power of formal removal is a
constitutionally required, immutable feature of the deportation
98
system. Because the federal government must bear the direct costs
of deportation, it is best situated to determine how many people
should be deported.
The direct costs and benefits of deportation, however, do not
translate into helpful enforcement priorities. One inference that
may be made is that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 596 (2012) (arguing that states
insisting on aggressive participation in immigration enforcement “reversecommandeer” federal resources “that would not otherwise be committed”).
96
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1714–19.
97
Although sub-federal officials appear to care about violations of federal
immigration law a great deal, it is far more likely that their dissatisfaction is related to
the indirect consequences of federal enforcement patterns. If Congress were to pass
universal amnesty tomorrow, making all current violators into legal residents, those
who pushed for greater enforcement would not likely deem the problem solved,
although the federal rule of law interest would be extinguished.
98
See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to
Congress.”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control
immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal
government.”).
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(“ICE”) should target those individuals who are easiest—cheapest—
to locate. That approach might make the deportation regime more
efficient, but ease of detection in itself does not correspond to any
meaningful quality we would associate with the least desirable types.
Another inference is that ICE should target repeat violators and
absconders—that is, individuals who in some sense inflict greater
harms to the rule of law. That is a more germane criterion. Were it
the only relevant factor determining priority for deportation
however, it would ignore some of the most keenly experienced
consequences of unauthorized migration, which may have little to do
with the fact of repeated violations.
This is not to claim that the public or public officials are
unconcerned about the sheer fact of violation of immigration law.
But vindicating the rule of law alone is insufficient to foreclose
consideration of all other characteristics of migrants that bear on
their social desirability. The findings of a recent study by Hainmuller
and Hopkins are instructive in this regard. The authors tested the
relative influence of nine immigrant attributes in driving
respondents’ support or opposition to the immigrants’ admission in
99
the U.S. They found that a violation of immigration laws (prior
unauthorized entry) does make hypothetical immigrants less likely to
be chosen for admission by respondents, but that its effect was
smaller than a number of other factors, such as having no plans to
work, not speaking English, or being a native of one of the few
100
strongly disfavored origin countries. If the preferences Hainmuller
and Hopkins find for immigration admissions are indicative of the
preferences people harbor regarding deportation, then the case for
prioritizing solely on the basis of the gravity of the legal violation is
undermined.
If we believe that at some relevant level of abstraction there is a
socially optimal priority scheme that identifies the least desired, or
highest-net cost types, then identifying priorities requires weighing
the relatively indirect consequences of deporting or forbearing. And
the federal government is not well positioned to identify and assess
most of the indirect costs and benefits associated with enforcement.
That is so because, as the discussion above demonstrates, the indirect
99

Hainmuller & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 1 (explaining that the “experiment
puts . . . [American] citizens in the position of immigration policymakers and asks
them to decide between pairs of immigrants applying for [naturalization,]” and
“identify which immigrant attributes make immigrants more or less likely to be
granted admission”).
100
Id. at 17–20.
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consequences are experienced chiefly at the local level and are
spatially variable. It is not wholly surprising that, in fact, the
considerations the federal government takes into account in setting
priorities for deportation exclude many of deep concern to their
101
citizens.
There is no ready hierarchy among the indirect consequences of
deportation and migrant presence, whence a priority system might
spring. As observed above, decisions concerning enforcement
priorities entail weighing the costs and benefits of deporting any
particular type and evaluating trade-offs entailed in targeting certain
types and forbearing with regard to others. Perhaps with the
exception of prioritizing the most serious security and criminal
102
threats, an exceedingly small fraction of all deportable individuals,
these decisions would differ from community to community. This
makes a singular, nation-wide priority scheme inadequate to the task.
Nor could these decisions be derived in some way from ascertainable
costs and benefits of unauthorized migration. This makes a singular
national decision-maker inadequate to the task. One could not simply
examine state budgets, for example, and determine the optimal
103
priority ranking for immigrant types for each state.
Setting
priorities calls for normative and political judgments that are
responsive to the variable circumstances and preferences of
communities experiencing the impact of unauthorized immigration
and the deportation of migrants from their midst.
Immigration scholars offer arguments grounded in similar
considerations when they seek to justify robust sub-federal
participation in regulating and integrating immigrants (as opposed
to enforcing the immigration law). Because the impact of migration
varies spatially, Rodriguez and others have concluded that there are
compelling functional reasons for states and localities to engage in
policy-making concerning language education, job training, day labor
104
centers, “sanctuary” laws, and so on.
Similarly, Cox and Posner
101

See infra Part III.A.
See infra note 210.
103
For this reason, the problem is not amenable to the kinds of remedies
suggested by the fiscal federalism literature. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Introduction to the Economics of Federalism 7 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. LE06-001, 2006) (discussing the literature on the use of
grants to solve the spillover problems created by fiscal federalism).
104
See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 608–09 (“The effects of immigration are
felt differently in different parts of the country, and the disruption immigration
causes, as well as the viability of different immigration strategies, will vary, in part,
according to the health of local economies and the existence of ethnic social
102
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argue that forms of partial delegation of authority pertaining to
immigration to “agents” (private and governmental) are justified on
informational grounds. Just like “[e]mployers can often do a far
superior job of evaluating the productivity of foreign workers,” and
family members “are generally in a better position . . . to evaluate the
capability of potential migrants to integrate after arrival,” “states have
more information about local immigration conditions . . . than does
105
the federal government.”
Similar considerations support the conclusion that sub-federal
governments can better identify priorities for deportation. That
conclusion does not depend on any particularly optimistic theory of
state or local democratic politics. The lower levels of government are
better positioned to formulate deportation priorities not simply
because sub-federal governments might be more “democratic” or
more responsive to their constituents. They are better positioned
because of their superior access to informational inputs required for
assessing the indirect consequences of migrant presence of greatest
concern to their constituents and the unique capacity for making
political choices about incommensurate goals. Beyond gathering
information about the local impact of migration, all that is needed is
that there be some mechanisms for sub-federal officials to elicit or
discern constituents’ attitudes towards consequences of unauthorized
immigration and some mechanisms of accountability that would
106
reflect the expression of opinions about priority decisions.
networks.”).
105
Cox & Posner, supra note 87, at 1289. It is worth emphasizing that empirical
studies, such as that authored by Pratheepan Gulasekaram and S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan, which show that local immigration policies are unrelated to
measurable “regionally specific, immigration-induced policy concerns” do not
necessarily undermine functional arguments for devolution. Immigration Federalism: A
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2080 (2013). We should not expect that
observable factors, such as the growth of the foreign-born population or poverty
levels, accurately predict local responses to immigration because different
communities are liable to accord variable weights to the same demographic,
economic, or cultural consequences of immigrant presence.
106
The information-based advantage is certainly augmented if state and local
governments are in fact more responsive to their constituents’ preferences than the
national government. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice
(N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 13625, 2009), available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13625/1/MPRA_paper_13625.pdf (reviewing the
basic theories why smaller governments are likely to be more accountable to their
constituents than the national government); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A
DIALOGUE 91–106, 139 (Northwestern Univ. Press 1995) (stating the same). For an
argument that at least some branches of sub-national governments are in fact less
responsive and less accountable to voter preferences, see David Schleicher, Why Is
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2. Addressing Objections to Decentralization
There are thus functional reasons to involve sub-federal
authorities in the process of determining which types of immigrants
to prioritize for deportation.
That is not to say functional
justifications for centralization are absent, or unworthy of
consideration. The most common objection made to other modes of
state and local participation in immigration enforcement is that it
invokes spillover effects. This objection, however, does not apply with
as much force to priority-setting.
The spillover-based argument raises legitimate concerns for
other kinds of state and local enforcement measures. For example,
Cunningham-Parmeter argues that states experimenting with
“enforcement-based” restrictionist measures “encourage the mass
exodus of unauthorized immigrants,” thereby “export[ing] to their
sister states the economic damage they claim illegal immigration
107
causes.”
Furthermore, these measures “demand additional
resources from the federal government to assist with verifying the
status of suspects” whom the state or local officials would like to
108
deport.
With regard to the spillovers in the form of “self-deporting”
unauthorized immigrants, priority-setting poses no special problems,
at least in principle. Even if we count the unauthorized immigrants
themselves as an externality, whether it is positive or negative will
depend on the priorities and preferences of the jurisdiction that the
109
immigrants enter. Consider what would theoretically follow if each
state set and publicized deportation priorities, which Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officials then followed in their decisions
to commence deportation proceedings.
Mass exodus or selfdeportation is hypothesized to occur when a jurisdiction engages in
aggressive enforcement that raises the probability of deportation for
There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The Role of Election Law, 23 J. LAW
& POL. 419 (2007) (arguing that local, city-level legislatures are in fact poor at
“translating voter preferences into government policy,” and do “not provide voters
with the ability to replace incumbents with opponents with different views and to
have their views represented in local policies”).
107
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1692.
108
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1678; see also Rodriguez, supra note 10,
at 627 (discussing the possibility of overtaxing the federal system by local requests for
status verification).
109
See Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 639 (“Immigrants are different in kind from
the paradigmatic externality example of pollution, largely because the presence of
(even unauthorized) immigrants may be welcomed (or at least tolerated) in some
communities but not in others.”).

TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE)

142

1/10/2014 3:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:107

all or most migrants. If one state’s deportation priorities were
credible, in principle, only the prioritized types would be driven
110
out. If they chose to exit, they would choose a destination state with
a better enforcement climate for their type. The influx of migrants,
whose deportation the destination state does not value sufficiently
highly, may not make this a positive spillover. However, it does mean
that the particular costs these migrants might impose are less
objectionable to the destination state than they are to the origin state.
Thus, if state participation in priority setting would impose costs on
other states, these would be less pronounced compared to the costs
created by the kinds of aggressive enforcement measures aimed at
complete self-deportation that states currently undertake. As will be
illustrated in the discussion of the status quo in Part III, existing
modes of state involvement are largely limited to measures intended
to trigger deportation or self-deportation across the board at one
extreme and sanctuary non-cooperation policies on the other. In a
universe where jurisdictions legislate and/or enforce their laws in a
manner that makes them either “hostile” or “receptive” to
immigrants, unauthorized migrants would flee hostile jurisdictions
for receptive ones. This, as Peter Spiro has argued, is not the worst
state of affairs, as it is preferable “to be driven from a hostile
California to a receptive New York than to be shut out of the United
111
States altogether.” As has been emphasized throughout this Article,
however, few jurisdictions are entirely hostile or receptive. As a
general matter, most care about their immigrants. If every state
articulated its enforcement priorities, sorting would better match
immigrant types to communities receptive to, or at least tolerant of,
their type.
With regard to costs externalized via pressure on federal
110

The notion that localities are capable of communicating their enforcement
priorities to the immigrant communities is not purely speculative. For example,
when Prince William County entered into a 287(g) partnership with the federal
government, which allowed its officers to carry out some immigration enforcement
functions, see infra note 139 and accompanying text, the police department issued
bilingual materials and conducted hundreds of briefings, to dispel the impression
that the program represents an all-out campaign to apprehend all deportable aliens,
and to explain that only criminal illegal immigrants would be targeted. See Randy
Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration
Enforcement 3 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287gdivergence.pdf.
111
Spiro, supra note 11, at 1635–36; see generally Hills, supra note 106 (explaining
that exit-based arguments about federalism and inter-jurisdictional competition rely
on the assumptions that people “flee[ing] oppressive subnational jurisdictions” have
“some non-predatory jurisdiction to which they can flee”).
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enforcement resources, it is unclear whether decentralizing priority
setting would alter sub-federal demands on these resources. Priority
setting would not give states or localities any more control over how
many immigrants are placed in deportation proceedings, and the cap
on this figure would continue to be determined by the federal
government. As suggested in the following section, states and
localities place pressures on federal resources in part because it is the
only avenue of influence open to them. If sub-federal priorities are
honored in deportation decisions, incentives for states to either flood
ICE with requests or to refuse to hand over individuals ICE requests
may be diminished.
Other considerations might be contemplated in favor of
centralized control. For present purposes, it is worth noting only that
values generally invoked for federal authority have no obvious
implications for the question of priority-setting. Centralized federal
112
power is said to be appropriate to ensure uniformity.
In this
context, an interest in uniformity appears absent. On the contrary, as
suggested above, any reasonable attempt to prioritize the least socially
desirable types for deportation cannot rest on a nationally uniform
scheme. Centralized power is sometimes justified on the basis of its
113
superior record of protecting civil rights. An interest in protecting
the rights of the nation’s non-citizens is compelling; however, as
several scholars have noted, it is not clear that the federal
government is better at protecting non-citizens’ civil rights than are
114
sub-federal governments.
Moreover, insofar as sub-national actors
do present a threat to the civil rights of immigrants or minorities, this
threat is independent of which authority sets deportation priorities.
Michael Olivas articulates the nature of the problem vividly: “We do
not want . . . fifty immigration policies. We certainly do not want and
cannot tolerate hundreds, allowing liberal Santa Fe, New Mexico to
carve out a ‘sanctuary’ while Hazleton, Pennsylvania or Norcross,
Georgia get to run every bilingual speaker or dark-complexioned
115
person out of town after sundown.”
As Part III will demonstrate,
112

See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 9, at 53–54 (arguing against state and local
involvement in immigration matters because “[w]e do not want fifty foreign affairs
policies, or fifty immigration policies”).
113
See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 9, at 526 (arguing that devolution of authority to
sub-national levels threatens equal protection and civil rights of immigrants).
114
See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 13, at 831 (arguing that on the basis of recent
experience, “it is by no means clear that the national government will better protect
the interests of non-citizens”); Schuck, supra note 10, at 60 (stating the same).
115
Olivas, supra note 9, at 53.
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the problem Olivas describes is to some extent unavoidable. Even
without formal authority over the key dimensions of the deportation
regime, state and local actors have ample opportunity to control the
fates and threaten the rights of non-citizens in their territories. There
is little reason to believe that these problems would be aggravated by
allowing sub-national officials to weigh in on priority setting.
III. THE DEPORTATION REGIME UNDER THE STATUS QUO
Part II of this Article set out a functional argument for subfederal participation in setting priorities for deportation, on the
grounds that uniform priorities are a crude way of identifying the
least desirable types of immigration violators. Part III will review how
the deportation regime has been functioning on the ground and
demonstrates that sub-federal subversion of federal de jure control
makes a uniform, centrally-set priority scheme unrealizable in
practice. The deportation regime has been shaped by a de jure
federal exclusivity with regard to both the number and type of
migrants targeted for deportation. Despite being legally disabled
from participating in priority-setting, sub-federal authorities have
been employing every tool at their disposal to undermine federal
control. What results is a federalist stand-off, in which sub-federal
actors influence the level of enforcement within their jurisdictions,
but neither federal nor sub-federal authorities can conform
deportation patterns to their priorities.
A. De Jure Federal Monopoly on Priority Setting
Although the notion that immigration enforcement should be
116
prioritized is not new, only relatively recently did the DHS publicize
a priority system that went beyond simply calling for a focus on
117
criminal aliens. DHS created a three-level priority scheme, with the
116

See Doris Meissner, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000) (setting out
priorities for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in enforcement) [hereinafter
Meissner Memo], available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference
/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminaljustice/government-documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-ProsecutorialDiscretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00.pdf/view. Since the functions of the INS were
folded into DHS, Congress repeatedly directed the Secretary of Homeland Security
to “prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the
severity of that crime.” See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3659 (2008).
117
E.g., John Morton, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011)
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first category being the highest priority, and the second and third
constituting equal but lesser priorities. Priority 1 are aliens who pose
a danger to national security or a risk to public safety. Priority 2 are
recent illegal entrants. Lastly, priority 3 aliens are fugitives (i.e., have
outstanding final removal orders) or otherwise obstruct immigration
118
controls. Priorities 1 and 3 are further subdivided into higher and
lower priority sub-categories. For example, persons who committed
more serious felonies are prioritized over those who committed
119
minor crimes.
Beyond the broad priority categories, a large list of individual
factors is to be considered in deciding whether to deport an
immigrant. These factors include, but are not limited to the
following: the length of presence in the country; family ties to U.S.
citizens; contribution to the community; military service; age; physical
120
or mental disability; and status as a victim or witness to a crime.
“[N]o one factor is determinative,” and discretion is to be exercised
121
on a case-by-case basis “based on the totality of the circumstances.”
The priority level and pertinent individual factors may be considered
at any stage by DHS law enforcement agents or attorneys in their
122
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Because prosecutorial
discretion encompasses the allocation of investigative resources, these
decisions too are to be guided by these priorities.
A regime that is effectively shaped by these priorities might still
seek to maximize the number of deportations, but would do so

[hereinafter June 17, 2011 Memo] (“In light of the large number of administrative
violations the agency is charged with addressing and the limited enforcement
resources the agency has available, ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement
personnel, detention space, and removal resources to ensure that the removals the
agency does conduct promote the agency’s highest enforcement priorities, namely
national security, public safety, and border security.”), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf.
118
John Morton, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Civil Immigration
Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2,
2011)
[hereinafter
March
2,
2011
Memo],
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf.
119
Id. at 3.
120
Id. at 3–4; June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 5–6.
121
See June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 4. A favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion with regard to some priority 1 individuals is statutorily
foreclosed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (The Attorney General “may cancel removal”
only if, inter alia, the alien has not been convicted of “specified offenses”).
122
See, e.g., June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 5 (“ICE may exercise
prosecutorial discretion at any stage of an enforcement proceeding.”).
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subject to the priority and resource constraints.
This does not
mean that enforcement resources would be allocated in accordance
with any precise solution to a constrained optimization problem. It
does mean that effecting one high-priority deportation would be
preferable to one low-priority deportation, all else being equal, but
that no particular mix of priority levels must characterize the
124
deported.
Moreover, discretionary judgments aimed at screening
for highest priority individuals would be clustered at the front-end of
the process. The earlier in the process high-priority individuals are
identified, the fewer resources are expended on that determination
later, and the greater the number of individuals deported at the
125
Concentrating discretion at the front-end also reinforces
end.
126
127
important political
and career pressures,
while potentially
123

There is ample indication that the agency remains focused on delivering the
highest possible number of deportations subject to the priority and resource
constraints. See, e.g., March 2, 2011 Memo, supra note 118, at 3 (“Nothing in this
memorandum should be construed to prohibit or discourage the apprehension,
detention, or removal of other aliens unlawfully in the United States. ICE special
agents, officers, and attorneys may pursue the removal of any alien unlawfully in the
United States.”); ICE, Fact-vs.-Fiction, http://www.ice.gov/news/fact-fiction/ (“Media
have suggested that ICE is aggressively dismissing cases based on a directive from
Director Morton. This just isn’t true.”).
124
A regime shaped by federal priorities would be unlikely to concentrate all
enforcement resources on deporting every last highest-priority alien. For this reason,
criticisms asserting that the federal government is not following its own priorities,
simply because an insufficiently large share of deportations consists of the highest
priority individuals, are misguided. See, e.g., AMALIA GREENBERG DELGADO ET AL.,
ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE HIGH PRICE OF
POLICING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 5, available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs
/criminal_justice/police_practices/costs_and_consequences.pdf (“[S]tatistics reveal
a failure to follow these priorities” because “[b]etween 2008 and 2010, of all those
deported nationwide under a new DHS program . . . only 28 percent were . . . Level 1
Priority . . . and 25 percent were ‘non-criminals.’”). At the same time, a prioritydriven regime would not lead to the deportation of every individual who has come to
the attention of the authorities. For that reason, criticisms such as Justice Scalia’s
regarding the administrative costs of President Obama’s policy of deferring
enforcement against young people are also misguided. See Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The husbanding of scarce
enforcement resources can hardly be the justification for [this policy], since the
considerable administrative cost . . . will necessarily be deducted from immigration
enforcement”).
125
See June 17, 2011 Memo, supra note 117, at 5 (“[I]t is generally preferable to
exercise . . . discretion as early in the case or proceeding as possible in order to
preserve government resources that would otherwise be expended in pursuing the
enforcement proceeding.”).
126
The political pressures on deportation policy arise from the need to navigate
between the accusation of a sub-rosa amnesty and the accusation of draconian
patterns of enforcement against sympathetic individuals. Accusations of a “back-door
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128

B. De Facto Sub-federal Subversion
Federal priorities are based on criminal history and the
seriousness of the violation of immigration law. A central motivation
for this, according to ICE, is to build on the “broad consensus in the
nation that persons convicted of serious crimes who are in the United
129
States illegally should be subject to deportation.”
It might indeed
seem that prioritizing criminal aliens is a “slam dunk,” as Schuck has
130
put it. It is “hard to imagine a higher law enforcement priority than
131
this.”
Nonetheless, many sub-federal actors manifestly disagree.
Their dissatisfaction with federal priorities is of great consequence
for the government, because the federal government relies on their
cooperation to identify and apprehend most deportable non-citizens
and because sub-federal actors have ample avenues to influence the
contours of the deportation regime.
The federal government relies on cooperation by state and local
LEAs because the overwhelming majority of civilian-state contacts
132
involve state or local forces.
Cooperation is especially vital for

amnesty” are much more likely to be aroused where the federal government has in
fact identified deportable individuals whom they decide not to deport. Likewise,
accusations of draconian enforcement will only arise if some initial enforcement
action is actually taken against particular individuals.
127
There is some evidence that DHS and DOJ disfavor affirmatively taking a
deportable individual out of the deportation process. See Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew
Becker, ICE Officials Set Quotas to Deport More Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST, March 26,
2010 (reporting that a memorandum from an ICE official applauded enforcement
officers for efforts to reach a record goal of 150,000 criminal alien removals in 2010),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26
/AR2010032604891.html.
128
See Cox & Posner, supra note 19.
129
ICE OFFICE OF THE DIR., ICE RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON SECURE
COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ICE
Response], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/ice-response-totask-force-on-secure-communities.pdf.
130
Schuck, supra note 10, at 72.
131
Id. at 74.
132
Although ICE is now the second largest investigative agency in the federal
government, it employs only 20,000 officers, by comparison with about 765,000
sworn local law enforcers. Brian Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2011). See
generally Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2006) (arguing in favor of
a vigorous immigration enforcement role relying, inter alia, on the superior
resources and access of state and local law enforcement).

TREYGER(DO NOT DELETE)

148

1/10/2014 3:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:107

133

identifying and deporting criminal aliens.
Sub-federal actors have
ample avenues to influence deportation patterns because local law
enforcement practices overwhelmingly determine who comes into
initial contact with immigration enforcement. In principle, “the
universe of opportunities to exercise prosecutorial discretion is
134
In practice, however, the exercise of discretion has been
large.”
heavily concentrated in the earlier stages of the process. “The
discretion that matters” for selecting the deportees, as Hiroshi
135
Motomura put it, has been “the discretion to arrest.”
This is
136
especially true for the unauthorized population. The chances that
any given deportable person would be targeted for investigation
and/or arrested are not overwhelming. The deportable population is
large, and resource constraints allow the investigation and arrest of
only a small fraction. Once a deportable individual is arrested,
however, the probability that he will be placed in deportation

133

See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 10, at 72 (“[E]ffective federal immigration
enforcement often depends upon the extensive participation of state and local
officials . . . particularly [in] enforcement against [criminal immigrants]”); Cox &
Posner, supra note 87, at 1337–40 (describing the vital advantages of delegation to
state and local officials). To be sure, the necessity of sub-federal cooperation in
immigration enforcement is not universally embraced. The unsuccessful attempts of
the federal government to coax states into advancing its priorities lead some scholars
to conclude that sub-federal participation in enforcement would only make the
immigration enforcement regime less effective as a whole. See, e.g., Olivas, supra note
9, at 35 (“[S]hifting immigration enforcement powers to sub-federal levels [will not
compensate for the federal government’s failure to enforce its laws, but] will more
likely lead to weaker federal enforcement and even less effective national security
resources aimed at immigration enforcement and administration. . . . [N]ot only is
shifting immigration authority downward contrary to constitutional law and theory, it
is bad policy and will lead to bad results both with immigration enforcement and
local enforcement.”).
134
William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor for U.S. ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion
2 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference
/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice
/government-documents/22092975-ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-DiscretionWilliam-J-Howard-10-24-05.pdf/view.
135
Motomura, supra note 15, at 1837; see also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 519 (2009)
(“[C]harging decisions rather than either the formal legal rules or the exercise of
judicial discretion determine who is deported and what collateral consequences
attach to deportation.”).
136
As Stephen Lee explains, for legally present non-citizens who are arrested for a
crime, the prosecutors’ charging decisions represent another node of discretionary
decision-making that dictate whether or not these non-citizens become deportable
and are ultimately deported. De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553, 586-87
(2013).
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proceedings, and ultimately deported, is very high.
While recent
developments in federal policy promise to shift the exercise of
138
discretion to later stages of the deportation process, the importance
of the initial arrest or detention is little diminished.
The following sections emphasize the levers available to subfederal authorities to thwart federal attempts to conform deportation
patterns to their priorities. Dissatisfied sub-federal actors are able to
decisively alter the mix of priority levels that characterize the
deported population through participation in federal-local
partnerships, state criminal law, and ordinary arrest, detention, and
charging practices.
1. 287(g) Partnerships
ICE operates several programs that enlist local agencies in
partnerships to enforce immigration law.
Of these, 287(g)
agreements involve local law enforcers most directly, and thus afford
the clearest illustration of how local disagreement with federal
139
priorities leads to their subversion.
The 287(g) agreements enable trained local law enforcers to
perform certain immigration functions, such as screening individuals
for immigration status, issuing detainers to hold potential violators
and even issuing charging documents that trigger removability
137

While difficult to estimate with confidence, Motomura calculates that
probability of deportation proceedings after arrest is between 75% and 100%, relying
on some simplifying assumptions. Motomura, supra note 15, at 1836. The
probability of Immigration Judges issuing a removal order was about 70% nationwide
in 2011. See TRAC, Tracking Outcomes of ICE Deportation Filings (Oct. 21, 2011),
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/263/. After a removal order is
issued, discretion in the form of deferred action has been numerically insignificant:
in 2010, deferred action was granted to 514 persons, or .1% of those ordered
deported. See Dara Lind, LA Opinion: Obama Has Granted a Record Low Number of
Deferred
Actions
to
Immigrants
(Apr.
28,
2011),
available
at
http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/la_opinion_obama_has_granted_a_record_lo
w_number_of_deferred_actions/.
138
Notably, the activation of Secure Communities, see infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
139
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the
Attorney General to deputize and train local law enforcement agencies to perform
certain functions of federal immigration officers, at local expense. 8 U.S.C. §
1357(g) (2013). Other programs, such as the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and
the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), are predominantly carried out
by federal officers, but do rely on local actors mostly to facilitate ICE access to
foreign-born inmates.
DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE
MACHINERY 105 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org
/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf.
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140

proceedings. The stated purpose of these partnerships is to identify
141
In practice,
and apprehend serious criminals and fugitive aliens.
LEAs empowered to act by these agreements pursued a wider set of
targets. LEAs that acquired the authority to arrest immigration
violators, for example, employed it to indiscriminately sweep in many
non-criminals. Maricopa County’s Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), under
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, and Alamance County’s Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”),
under Sheriff Terry S. Johnson, furnish the most notorious examples.
The MCSO employed its new authority to engage in policing driven
by “bias-infected indicators,” and MCSO deputies were found to
“stop, detain, and/or arrest Latino drivers . . . without reasonable
142
suspicion or probable cause.”
Among other findings, the ACSO
Sheriff was found to have explicitly directed officers “to arrest all
Latinos who commit[ed] the traffic infraction of driving without a
license” in order to “bring them into the Alamance County Jail to be
run through immigration databases, rather than simply issuing them
143
citations.”
The Department of Justice (DOJ) investigated these
LEAs and determined that both the MCSO and the ACSO violated
144
the Constitution.
Maricopa and Alamance may be extreme
140

Under the “jail model,” these agreements deputize local officers to screen the
immigration status of arrested individuals; under the “task force” model, officers are
authorized to enforce immigration law “on the street,” including the issuance of
arrest warrants and detainers. For a detailed explanation, see Capps et al., supra note
110, at 13–16.
141
Although the federal priority system was not spelled out until 2010, earlier
declarations that criminal and fugitive aliens are to be prioritized were commonplace
in Congress and the DHS. See RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, A
PROGRAM IN FLUX: NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR 287(G)
(2010), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf.
142
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT RE: UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE
MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 3 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ MCSO
Report] (finding evidence of racial profiling of Latino drivers, and of “immigrationrelated crime suppression activities” based on “complaints that described no criminal
activity, but rather referred . . . to individuals with ‘dark skin’ congregating in one
area, or individuals speaking Spanish”), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt
/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.
143
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT RE: UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE
ALAMANCE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 5 (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ ACSO
Report],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources
/171201291812462488198.pdf.
144
Id. at 2; DOJ MCSO Report, supra note 142, at 3. Reacting to MCSO’s
indiscriminant use of authority, ICE initially declined to renew the agreement
granting the MCSO arrest authority in 2009, and ultimately, terminated the MCSO’s
involvement in immigration enforcement. See Office of the Press Secretary, Statement
by Secretary Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County
(Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretarynapolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county.
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examples. Yet, as numerous evaluations confirm, the apparent
disregard for federal priorities has been widespread, and much of the
local contribution to the deportation pipeline has consisted of people
145
charged with or convicted of misdemeanors and traffic offenses.
This experience led DHS to revise the terms of the agreements to
provide for more extensive federal oversight, and ultimately, to
146
announce that it is scaling down the 287(g) program.
While scaling down 287(g) programs constrains the most farreaching authority granted to local actors, it does not foreclose the
opportunities for sub-federal authorities to influence immigration
enforcement.
Even in the absence of delegated functions,
substantive criminal laws and ordinary criminal law enforcement are
sufficient to undermine federal attempts to affect its priorities.
2. Substantive Criminal Law
State criminal law not only determines which non-citizens
become deportable, but also influences where individuals fit into the
federal priority scheme. For example, whether an individual has
been convicted of two or more felonies “punishable by more than
one year,” which would place him into level 1 of priority category 1,
145

See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS: FY 2011 UPDATE 9 ( “ICE cannot be assured
that the 287(g) program is meeting its intended purpose, or that resources are being
appropriately targeted toward aliens who pose the greatest risk to public safety and
the community”), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11119_Sep11.pdf; RICHARD M. STANA, GAO, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009) (finding no evidence that 287(g) agreements
advanced
the
federal
enforcement
priorities),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf; DORA SCHRIRO, ICE, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2009) (finding that in 2008, 57% of
the noncitizens in detention as the result of the 287(g) program were noncriminal,
and 72% of the initial bookings were noncriminal, with those figures being 53% and
65% in 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf; Capps et al., supra note 110, at 2 (finding that the 287(g) program
is not targeted toward serious offenders, as about half of the program activity involves
people who have committed misdemeanors or traffic offenses).
146
See John Morton, Statement Regarding a Hearing on U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request to Congress (Mar. 8, 2012) (“ICE will begin
by discontinuing the least productive 287(g) task force agreements in those
jurisdictions where Secure Communities is already in place and will also suspend
consideration of any requests for new 287(g) agreements.”), available at
http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=38896&linkid=244574; see also
Fact
Sheet:
Updated
Facts
on
ICE’s
287(g)
Program,
ICE,
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2013).
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hinges in part on the application of state criminal laws. So does the
existence of convictions for “crimes punishable by less than one
year,” which place a person into priority 1, level 2 (if for three such
crimes) and level 3 (if fewer than three). As a number of scholars
have noted, states can and do use their criminal laws to “facilitate the
criminal prosecution of unauthorized migrants at the state and local
147
level.” The same laws may trigger civil deportation proceedings and
elevate, or lower, an individual’s priority level.
Several states, for example, have enacted criminal laws that
mirror the federal provision criminalizing smuggling or harboring
148
undocumented aliens. Maricopa County has adopted an ingenious
interpretation of Arizona’s smuggling law in order to prosecute
immigrants who use the services of coyotes (smugglers) with
149
conspiracy to violate that law, a felony. Interpreting the law in that
150
manner effectively “criminalizes unlawful presence,” and raises the
priority levels of a large class of aliens, who might not be guilty of any
151
felony under federal law. While this particular interpretation of the
smuggling statute was recently enjoined by a federal judge on federal
152
preemption grounds, as was the South Carolina statute explicitly
153
criminalizing self-smuggling, there is no shortage of laws that may
147

Jennifer M. Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 138 (2009).
148
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2319; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 446 (West)
(2012); Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-114 (2012). See generally, Stumpf, supra note 9, at
1599 (discussing states that have “enacted laws similar to the federal prohibitions on
smuggling or harboring undocumented immigrants”).
149
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1003(A); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2319. For a
fascinating account of these prosecutions, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration
Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2011).
150
Eagly, supra note 149, at 1773; United States v. S. Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529
(4th Cir. 2013) (addressing a South Carolina statutory provision that similarly made
it a felony “for an unlawfully present person to allow himself or herself to be
‘transported or moved’ within the state or to be harbored or sheltered to avoid
detection,” and finding that it would be nearly impossible for such a person to avoid
violating this provisions).
151
That is, a person convicted of the conspiracy felony under Maricopa’s
interpretation might otherwise be guilty of illegal entry, a misdemeanor, which
would put him into priority 2 under the federal scheme; a felony conviction for the
same conduct instantly raises his priority level to 1.
152
We Are Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs, CIV 06-2816-PHX-RCB, 2013 WL
5434158 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2013) (holding that federal law preempts and renders
invalid the Maricopa policy of prosecuting unauthorized immigrants for smuggling
themselves).
153
United States v. S. Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 530 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming the
district court’s holding that plaintiffs established a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits in their challenge to a provision, which made it a criminal offense for
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be applied to similar effect. Laws that criminalize the use of false
documents may have similar effects when applied to individuals who
would not have been subject to federal prosecution. For example,
Arizona’s general identity theft law criminalizes as a felony the
“taking the identity of another person . . . real or fictitious . . .
154
whether or not the person . . . actually suffers any economic loss.”
This law, as Chacon observed, “can be deployed as a means of
prosecuting noncitizens who have used false identities to obtain
employment,” even if that noncitizen would not be prosecuted or
found guilty under federal laws governing the use of such false
155
documents. The sole surviving provision of California’s Proposition
187 makes the use of false documents a felony when done “to
156
conceal . . . true citizenship or resident alien status.”
As Stumpf
observes, the state law relies on contentious concepts of “true
citizenship or resident alien status;” thus, state interpretations of
these may depart from federal understandings, leading to convictions
157
of persons who would otherwise not be criminally liable. Such laws
offer disgruntled local actors a way to ensure that non-citizens, who
do not engage in any conventionally criminal conduct, become
158
prioritized for deportation.
The constitutionality of some state
criminal laws that parallel immigration law, such as the
criminalization of self-smuggling, has been put in doubt by Arizona v.
159
United States. Nonetheless, other laws that link criminal liability to
“a person unlawfully present in the United States to conceal, harbor, or shelter
herself from detection, or allow herself to be transported within the state,” on federal
preemption grounds).
154
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2008 (2008).
155
Chacon, supra note 147, at 138.
156
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that provisions of Proposition 187 criminalizing making and using
false documents to conceal true citizenship or resident alien status of person were
not preempted by federal law).
157
See Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1599. Persons who are convicted under the
California law might otherwise be subject to only civil penalties under the analogous
federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2013), which enacts civil and criminal penalties for a
variety of violations regarding false immigration documents.
158
For an account of a marked change in the patterns of enforcement of the
false-documents crime in Los Angeles as the county’s orientation towards
immigration enforcement evolved, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens:
An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 NYU L. REV. 1126, 1167–79 (2013).
159
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–05 (2012) (finding both challenged provisions that
created new immigration-based state crimes preempted: the crime of noncompliance with federal registration law, on the ground that the state provision
intruded into the field in which Congress has left no room for states to act; and the
crime of working without authorization, on the ground that a state’s criminalization
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immigration status—notably, laws of general applicability and those
that parallel generally applicable criminal law—appear to be on
160
firmer footing.
Local actors are further able to manipulate a deportable noncitizen’s priority level through plea bargaining and sentencing.
Prosecutors and courts have in the past structured plea bargains to
161
avoid (or create) deportation consequences for some defendants.
Similarly, these actors may adopt plea bargaining practices to lower
particular defendants’ priority levels—by, for example, allowing them
to plead guilty for crimes punishable by less than one year, rather

of that which Congress decided should be regulated civilly, presents an obstacle to
the regulatory system).
160
Several courts held that laws of general applicability applied to non-citizens,
and laws that parallel generally-applicable prohibitions, are constitutionally sound.
See, e.g., Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 740 S.E.2d 583 (2013) (holding that a
statute requiring a driver’s license to be obtained within 30 days before driving
within state was not preempted by federal immigration law); Hernandez v. State, 639
S.E.2d 473 (2007) (rejecting the alien defendant’s claim that federal immigration law
preempts the enforcement of a general identity fraud statute); State v. HernandezMercado, 879 P.2d 283 (Wash. 1994) (holding that a statute criminalizing unlicensed
possession of a firearm by an alien is not preempted). See generally Jennifer M.
Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 628 (2012)
(“State efforts that criminalize activities in order to affect migration indirectly,”
rather than directly by mirroring federal immigration prohibitions, “have, in many
cases, avoided court scrutiny”); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J.
251, 274 (2011) (“[S]tates likely have the power to enact criminal laws that affect
only undocumented noncitizens, so long as those laws are rational, are within
traditional state power, seek a permissible goal, and are consistent with federal
classifications.
[E.g.,] state laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by
undocumented noncitizens are likely constitutional.”); Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1608
(“When there is a strong parallel with federal immigration law and no parallel
criminal law applicable regardless of citizenship, the subnational criminal law is
unlikely to survive[,]” but laws that parallel generally-applicable criminal law “stand[]
a greater chance of surviving, even when the law singles out noncitizens and parallels
existing immigration law.”). For an account of how enforcement of such laws reflects
local attitudes towards immigration enforcement, see Eagly, supra note 158, at 1167–
68, 1185–87.
161
See Lee, supra note 136, at 578–80 (describing instances of prosecutorial
charging decisions adopted to avoid deportation of criminal defendants); Gabriel J.
Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the
Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1433–35 (2011) (describing charging and
bargaining practices structured to avoid deportation consequences); Stumpf, supra
note 9, at 1593–94 (explaining that “legislatures and courts can often affect
whether . . . deportability grounds apply by adjusting the scope of the definition or
length of the sentence”); Spiro, supra note 11, at 1634 n.28 (noting the ability of subnational actors “to undermine enforcement . . . by adjusting criminal sentences to
preclude deportation in individual cases”).
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162

than more than one year.

3. Secure Communities and Ordinary Criminal Law
Enforcement
LEAs most significantly exercise their influence on the selection
of non-citizens for deportation in the course of ordinary criminal law
enforcement. LEA policies and practices concerning arrests and
investigations of immigration statuses matter a great deal in
determining who comes into contact with the deportation system.
This influence, moreover, is not neutralized by the gradual
nationwide activation of Secure Communities, a data interoperability
system that automatically transmits information on each arrest to
163
ICE.
Prior to its activation, whether an individual came into contact
with the immigration enforcement system was to a great degree
determined by local discretion. DHS is required by law to “respond
to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking
164
to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status.” Thus,
whenever a local official contacts ICE with such inquiries, the
enforcement machinery is put in motion, with the corresponding
165
increase in probability of deportation for that individual.
Jurisdictions seeking more aggressive enforcement needed only to
adopt a policy or practice of regular verification of the immigration
status of those arrested or detained, or other individuals encountered
166
in the course of ordinary law enforcement. In one survey of police
162

See Lee, supra note 136, at 577–80 (offering examples of prosecutors
structuring charges to “unsettle, dilute, or outright displace federal priorities”);
Eagly, supra note 158, at 1164–65 (“[T]he Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office has
officially given deputy prosecutors the discretion to take collateral consequences,”
including deportation, “into account and depart from ordinary settlement policy in
lower-level cases.”).
163
Under Secure Communities, fingerprints taken by LEAs are automatically
transmitted to the FBI and then to DHS; if the person has been previously
fingerprinted by an immigration official, the database will register a “match.” ICE
then reviews other databases to determine whether the person is deportable. See The
Secure Communities Process, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
164
8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1996). DHS operates the Law Enforcement Support
Center (LESC), which is responsible for answering status inquiries from various
agencies. If LESC determines that a given individual is in violation of the
immigration laws, ICE will have to expend resources determining whether or not to
seek deportation. See David Palmatier, Decl. of Unit Chief for LESC, Arizona, 2012
WL 406205, at *91 (2012) [hereinafter Palmatier Declaration].
165
See notes supra 135–137, and accompanying text.
166
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-1051(B) (West 2012) (requiring state officers to
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chiefs and sheriffs, 59% of respondents indicated that it was their
practice or policy to routinely check the immigration status of a
possible victim of human trafficking, and 21% of police chiefs and
27% of county sheriffs would do so for individuals stopped as a traffic
167
violation.
The section of Arizona’s SB 1070 that contained such a policy
was the only one to survive the constitutional challenge. The
mandate to determine immigration status—that is, to contact LESC—
may therefore be triggered by seizures short of formal arrests (e.g.,
routine traffic stops). In this way, LEAs are able to compel ICE
attention to potential immigration law violators who have not
committed crimes, thereby diverting resources from federal
168
priorities.
To be sure, ICE is still able to exercise discretion and
take no action in these cases, as it threatened to do with regard to
169
Arizona’s inquiries after the Supreme Court’s decision.
However,
the volume diminishes the resources that ICE may devote to screen
for and pursue higher priority violators, and compels ICE to choose
between pursuing non-priority deportations and incurring the
170
political cost of forbearance after a violator has been identified.
On the other hand, localities that want no part in enforcing
immigration laws adopted different policing and law enforcement

make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person
they stop or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that
the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States,” and “[a]ny
person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before
the person is released”); see also Rodríguez, supra note 10, at 591–92 (summarizing
direct enforcement actions in Georgia, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Arizona);
Huntington, supra note 13, at 801–02 (discussing the inherent enforcement authority
of states and localities); Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1598 (discussing local attempts to
exercise non-delegated immigration powers).
167
Monica W. Varsanyi et al., A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration
Federalism in the United States, 34 L. & POL’Y 146 (2011), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00356.x/abstract.
168
See Palmatier Declaration, supra note 164, at *91 (explaining in detail how the
increased volume of queries from Arizona would impact priorities). The burden
placed on LESC was one of the factors the United States emphasized in its attack on
Arizona’s SB 1070, arguing that Arizona’s aggressive enforcement policy would be
“hijacking” federal resources, “shift[ing] the allocation of federal resources away
from federal priorities.” United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (D. Ariz.
2010).
169
Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, AZ CAP.
TIMES (June 25, 2012), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25
/homeland-security-revokes-287g-immigration-check-agreements-inarizona/#ixzz2jX7qglQC.
170
See supra notes 126–127.
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policies. “Sanctuary” or non-cooperation policies, implemented by
statutes, executive orders, or police policies, aim to limit local or state
officials’ cooperation with DHS in apprehending and processing of
171
immigration violators.
Congress sought in 1996 to curtail subfederal non-cooperation by forbidding officials from restricting a
voluntary exchange of information regarding immigration status
172
between local officials and ICE.
Congressional action limited the
forms that non-cooperation can take, but it could not counteract all
173
The LAPD’s non-cooperation policy, for example,
such efforts.
which directed officers not to “initiate police action where the
objective is to discover the alien status of a person,” but did not
prohibit voluntary communications between LA police and ICE, was
174
found to be consistent with federal statute.
Similar policies guide
175
law enforcement in numerous jurisdictions. Prior to the activation
of Secure Communities, these sorts of policies and practices withheld
from ICE information about high- and low-priority immigration
violators alike, diminishing the overall numbers of deportations in
sanctuary-type jurisdictions.
The activation of Secure Communities was intended in part to
constrain the impact of local practices on the size and composition of
the population placed in deportation proceedings. That effect,
however, relies on the expectation “that LEAs continue to enforce
171

See Rodriguez supra note 10, at 600–605; Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Rights
not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1373, 1382–95 (2006).
172
8 U.S.C. §1373, §1644 (1996); City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29
(2d. Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the federal restrictions on noncooperation).
173
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
174
Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1421 (2009) (upholding the
LAPD policy against a facial constitutional challenge, and reasoning that Special
Order 40 “does not address communication with ICE; it addresses only the initiation
of police action and arrests for illegal entry. [8 U.S.C.] Section 1373(a) does not
address the initiation of police action or arrests for illegal entry; it addresses only
communications with ICE”).
175
See, e.g., New Haven, Conn., New Haven Police Department General Order 062 (Dec. 14, 2006) (prohibiting officers from inquiring about the immigration status
of victims, witnesses, and anyone who approaches an officer for assistance, and
prohibiting detention based on belief of illegal presence or civil immigration
violation,
including
administrative
warrants
by
ICE),
available
at
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID=%7B874974A9-AC89465B-A649-57D122E9FAF9%7D; OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850(1) (2007) (providing that
no Oregon law enforcement agency “shall use agency [resources] for the purpose of
detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are
persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal
immigration laws”).
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the criminal law in exactly the same manner as they did before
Secure Communities was activated,” and that LEAs fully cooperate
176
with ICE detainer requests.
Neither expectation appears well-founded.
Instead of
diminishing their role, Secure Communities merely altered the
manner in which sub-federal authorities could influence the
177
deportation process. LEAs intent on more aggressive enforcement
have several avenues still open to them. They are able, in particular,
to aggressively arrest for petty crimes (e.g., traffic violations)
178
committed by foreign-appearing individuals.
The automatic
process set off by Secure Communities makes it unnecessary for LEAs
to incur any costs in effort or resources beyond arresting and fingerprinting suspected unauthorized aliens. States may even broaden the
arrest authority of their police to the constitutional limits, allowing
arrests upon probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed
179
any misdemeanor, including the misdemeanor of illegal entry.
States may also expand the use of fingerprinting to all minor
offenses. Moreover, Secure Communities does not affect Arizonastyle mandates to verify immigration statuses of individuals detained
in contexts short of formal arrests.
The power to arrest is complemented by the discretionary power
to charge. The initial determination of an immigration violator’s
priority level is based in part on the offense of arrest, or offense
180
charged, and not just convictions existing as of the time of arrest.
176

See ICE Response, supra note 129, at 11.
See Jennifer M. Chacon, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 603 (2012) (implying that the theorized shift of discretion
back to the federal government from sub-federal actors may not be borne out in
practice).
178
Eagly documents examples of such arrest policies: in Harris County, Texas, for
instance, police refuse to “cite and release” for petty offenses, choosing to take
custody and book all such suspects. See Eagly, supra note 158, at 1173–74. Likewise, a
public defender in Miami-Dade County, Florida, reports the increase in arrests “for
charges we would not normally see,” and of which “many are dismissed outright,”
after the activation of Secure Communities. Alex Stepick, FALSE PROMISES: THE
FAILURE OF SECURE COMMUNITIES IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC POLICY, CENTER FOR LABOR RESEARCH & STUDIES, FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 9 (2013).
179
See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1413 (“In theory, local police
could arrest for misdemeanor improper entry into the United States.”).
180
As the GAO explains in its review of the program, “aliens are initially classified
as Level 1, 2, or 3” based on “available information on the aliens’ arrest charges and
any previous convictions.” GAO, SECURE COMMUNITIES, REPORT TO THE RANKING
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 22 (July
2012) (emphasis added) [hereinafter GAO 2012 Report], available at
177
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LEAs intent on more aggressive enforcement may seek the most
serious plausible charges, as this increases the likelihood that ICE will
181
issue a detainer and seek custody of the individual. Under Secure
Communities, the decision to pursue more serious charges imposes
few costs, because local officials can decide not to prosecute and
instead, transfer the suspected violators to ICE custody promptly
182
upon receiving a detainer request.
The question of whether and how Secure Communities
influenced local arresting and charging practices awaits systematic
empirical investigation; yet, there is some indication that local actors
are continuing to use the tools at their disposal to affect the
deportation system. Available data suggests that most arrests are
made for traffic offenses, where the discretion to arrest (or cite and
183
release) is at its peak.
Preliminary studies also suggest the
likelihood that Secure Communities lead some LEAs to engage in
184
pretextual arrests of Hispanic individuals.
DHS officials are
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592415.pdf. Thus, aliens ultimately removed may
not have “a criminal conviction known to ICE at the time ICE took custody,” and
ultimately, “may not . . . [be] convicted of the current criminal charge(s) for which
they were arrested.” Id. at 15 n.29. Because “ICE could change the classification if
the alien’s charges are dropped,” removal statistics reveal that many of the deported
are not convicted of any crime. Id. at 22 n.30. Nationwide, that share was 26%
(October 2008 to March 2012), but there is variability across jurisdictions: for
example, 41% of those identified and deported from Florida had no criminal
convictions, while that share in Texas stood at 17%. Id. at 19. Although many factors
likely contribute to these spatial differences, it is consistent with the possibility that
LEAs in different jurisdictions are pursuing different arrest and charging strategies.
181
See Eagly, supra note 158, at 1188(“[P]rosecutors have gone further by actually
choosing among potential charges with the objective of influencing immigration
results.”). While DHS generally cannot deport individuals who are convicted before
they complete their sentence, see INA § 241(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(4)(A)
(2006), there is no barrier to removal if the state criminal charges that led to the
identification of a deportable individual via Secure Communities are not pursued.
182
Eagly documents a related phenomenon in Maricopa County’s enforcement
of the smuggling law: the county “either transfers suspected self-smugglers directly to
ICE or gives very low criminal sentences (of “time served” or probation), which
facilitate immediate removal,” while reducing law enforcement costs. Eagly, supra
note 158, at 1186.
183
ICE did not collect data on arrest charges until October 2010, and since then,
this data was missing for 56% of aliens identified and removed through Secure
Communities. “For the 44 percent of aliens removed on whom ICE collected arrest
charge data, traffic offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, were
the most frequent arrest charges.” GAO 2012 Report, supra note 180, at second
cover page, 14.
184
See Aarti Kohli et al., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW
AND SOCIAL POLICY RESEARCH REPORT 3 (Oct. 2011) (finding some evidence that
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concerned about the incentives created by Secure Communities. To
curtail the possibility of local subversion of this sort, a monitoring
system was put in place that is aimed at detecting jurisdictions that
185
are making improper arrests.
How well such a monitoring system
would detect and deter subversion of federal priorities remains to be
seen. In view of the difficulties of making inferences on the basis of
186
available data, which ICE recognizes,
the likely effects of
monitoring on sub-federal subversion are ambiguous. ICE leadership
also directed its officials not to issue detainers on the basis of “minor
traffic misdemeanors or other relatively minor misdemeanors,” unless
the violations “reflect a clear and continuing danger to others or
187
disregard for the law.” Such an approach might serve to screen out
some low-level traffic violators—but not before limited resources are
expended on the determination. Moreover, local officers determine
the crime of arrest, with little standing in their way of identifying a
188
non-traffic offense as the crime of arrest.
It is unclear, moreover,
whether ICE at present possesses the capacity to base its initial
189
In sum,
detainer decisions on the nature of the crime of arrest.
aggressive jurisdictions still have a number of levers available to flood
ICE with a large, low-priority pool of candidates.

Secure Communities lead law enforcement agencies “to engage in racial profiling
through the targeting of Latinos for minor violations or pretextual arrests”), available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf;
see also supra note 178.
185
See DHS, SECURE COMMUNITIES: STATISTICAL MONITORING (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-statistical-monitoring.pdf
[hereinafter Statistical Monitoring].
186
Id. at 1 (noting that “some [statistical] anomalies [in arrest patterns] are likely
to be pure artifacts of the limited data available,” and outlining several important
limitations of the data available for monitoring).
187
JOHN MORTON, ICE, CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: GUIDANCE ON THE USE
OF DETAINERS IN THE FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 2
n.2 (Dec. 21, 2012), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionreform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf.
188
See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 158, at 1183 (quoting a Maricopa County public
defense attorney, who explains that “an inoffensive traffic stop for some violation of
the traffic code invariably turns into a felony forgery charge when the driver provides
what the police officer believes is a fraudulent driver’s license or identification either
from Arizona or Mexico”).
189
See Statistical Monitoring, supra note 185, at 7 (“ICE does not currently receive
analyzable data on the nature of the arrest for which a fingerprint submission is
being made”; ICE does “not know in real time whether a submission is based on a
traffic offense or a violent crime,” and “rel[ies]on follow-up ICE investigations to
make that data available”).
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4. Sanctuary and Non-Cooperation Policies
Nor does Secure Communities eviscerate the power of sanctuary
jurisdictions to serve as gate-keepers to the deportation system. First,
states can choose to keep minor offenders hidden from federal
190
191
attention by not booking them or by not taking fingerprints.
Second, criminal charges may be reduced or dropped, so as to lower
the initial priority level of arrested non-citizens. Third, LEAs are able
to exercise their own discretion when it comes to complying with ICE
192
requests to hold suspected violators.
The most recent and most
visible such measure is California’s TRUST Act, which prohibits state
and local law enforcement from holding certain low-level arrestees on
193
the basis of ICE detainers.
A number of other jurisdictions have
been adopting similar measures: Cook County, for instance,
announced that the Sheriff’s Office will honor ICE detainers only if
ICE has a criminal warrant, ICE enters into a written agreement to
reimburse Cook County for the cost of holding the detainees, or if
Cook County has a law enforcement purpose not related to
194
immigration to hold the person. Santa Clara, CA, and Washington
D.C. both limited compliance with ICE detainers to individuals over
18 years of age, and only to those convicted of a “serious or violent
felony” (“dangerous crime or crime of violence” in DC) within 10
years of the request, or released after having served a sentence for
195
such a felony within 5 years of the request.
190

In many jurisdictions, the decision whether to make a custodial arrest or cite
and release is left to the discretion of the officers, and a law enforcement agency may
direct its officers not to book minor offenders, in part to avoid the Secure
Communities screening. See Eagly, supra note 158, at 1158–59 (describing the Los
Angeles policy of citing and releasing for low-level crimes).
191
See ICE Response, supra note 129129, at 14 (noting that “states can choose not
to submit to the federal government the fingerprints for individuals arrested for
minor offenses”).
192
See, e.g., Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (S.D. Ind.
2011) quoting (“A detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather a voluntary request
that the law enforcement agency ‘advise [DHS], prior to release of the alien, in order
for [DHS] to arrange to assume custody.’”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011)).
193
Patrick McGreevy, Signing Trust Act is Another Illegal-immigration Milestone for
Brown, L. A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-brownimmigration-20131006,0,5441798.story#axzz2jv4eEQdy.
194
See Policy for Responding to ICE Detainers, COOK COUNTY LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE
SERVICES
(Sept.
7,
2011),
http://cookcountygov.com
/ll_lib_pub_cook/cook_ordinance.aspx?WindowArgs=1501.
195
Santa Clara County Resolution Adding Board Policy 3.54 Relating to Civil
Immigration
Detainer
Requests,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org
/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Santa%20Clara%20County%20Detainer
%20Ordinance.pdf; COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE ON THE
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If aggressive enforcers undermine federal deportation policy by
“diluting” the pool of deportation candidates and diverting resources
from higher- to lower-priority candidates, jurisdictions with sanctuary
measures undermine it by keeping potentially higher priority
candidates away from ICE and diverting apprehension resources
from other areas towards the task of re-apprehending individuals
already in county custody. As a result of Cook County’s noncooperation, for example, 268 detainers for individuals charged or
convicted of a crime were disregarded, and ICE was able to locate
196
only 15 after release.
Federal immigration enforcers are besieged on both sides. The
ability of state and local police to use criminal law, arrest powers, and
the discretion inherent in routine law enforcement “to decide who
will be,” and who will not be, “exposed to federal immigration
enforcement,” makes them the de facto “gatekeepers” of the
197
deportation pipeline.
C. The Trouble with the Status Quo
If, as was argued in Part I, centrally crafted and nation-wide
priorities are poor proxies for sorting migrants on the basis of social
desirability, why should sub-federal subversion of federal priorities be
of any concern? There are a few reasons to regret the state of affairs.
First, de jure federal exclusivity over priority setting fortifies
incentives for states and localities to engage in problematic
198
More central to present
“criminalization” of immigration law.
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 19-585, IMMIGRATION DETAINER COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT
ACT OF 2012 (May 8, 2012), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001
/20120604161227.pdf; Mihir Zaveri, D.C. Council Votes to Limit Reach of Federal Effort
POST
(June
5,
2012),
Aimed
at
Illegal
Immigration,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-council-votes-to-limit-reach-of-federal
-effort-aimed-at-illegal-immigration/2012/06/05/gJQAVgm5GV_story.html. See also
Brent Begin, San Francisco County Jail Won’t Hold Inmates for ICE, S. F. EXAMINER (May
6, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/05
/san-francisco-county-jail-won-t-hold-inmates-ice; National Immigration Forum,
Community and Courtroom Responses to Immigration Detainers (Jan. 2012),
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images
/uploads/2012/Detainers_Bonds_Litigation.pdf (describing policies in New York
City, Sonoma, Santa Clara, and San Francisco Counties in California, and Taos and
San Miguel Counties in New Mexico).
196
See Toni Preckwinkle, Letter to John Morton 2 (Jan. 19, 2012) (discussing
Morton’s earlier letter to Preckwinkle) (on file with author).
197
Motomura, supra note 15, at 1822.
198
Insofar as the increasing entanglement of criminal and immigration law is
worrisome, as many immigration scholars argue, the incentives created by federal
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concerns, under the status quo, the deportation regime does not do a
good job of prioritizing the least socially desirable violators of
immigration laws. Critics of sub-federal involvement in immigration
enforcement point out that instead of advancing federal priorities,
199
local officials are pursuing their own local preferences.
Scholars
who are less critical note that this is not necessarily pernicious, as it
allows for local conditions and information to bear on the screening
200
function that deportation is intended to serve.
If the status quo actually allowed states and localities to assert
local societal preferences over the federally imposed ones, there
might not be a need to formally decentralize priority setting.
However, the sense in which states and localities may be said to
pursue “their own priorities” is markedly different from the sense in
which DHS attempts to pursue federal priorities. The actual effect of
rebellious jurisdictions’ activity is on the level of enforcement. Cook
County may decrease the level of immigration enforcement on its
territory by keeping some people out of the deportation pipeline.
Cook County cannot ensure, however, that the particular immigrants
or types are not in fact deported as a result of ICE’s independent
effort. Nor does it fully internalize the consequences of forbearance
with regard to all categories of migrants it declines to hand over to
ICE. Since ICE does in fact pursue enforcement on its territory, it
may well remove individuals whose presence would have aroused the
community’s opposition. Moreover, because local officials distance
themselves from deportation policy decisions, communities are
unlikely to perceive local officials as important and responsive policy-

prioritization of criminal aliens are problematic. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note at 9,
1613–15; Legomsky, supra note 70. The obvious path for sub-federal actors who
disagree with federal deportation practices is to use its criminal laws and law
enforcement to turn as many unauthorized migrants into criminals (or accused) as
possible, raising their priority levels. As others have pointed out, the fact that states
and localities are able to criminally prosecute deportable non-citizens for state
crimes, but are unable to formally initiate civil deportation proceedings creates the
same incentives. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 149, at 1755. For a comprehensive
account of how federal criminalization of immigration law drew subnational actors
into the business of immigration regulation and enforcement, see Stumpf, supra note
9, at 1587–1600.
199
See, e.g., Rodriguez et al., supra note 141, at 13 (“This devolution [of authority
via 287(g) agreements] arguably has permitted local officials, including elected
sheriffs, to set enforcement priorities to meet local concerns rather than to
contribute to a broader national enforcement agenda.”).
200
See Cox & Posner, supra note 87, at 1337–42 (explaining the advantages and
disadvantages of delegating immigration enforcement authority to states and
localities).
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makers in this arena. Restrictionist jurisdictions, such as Maricopa,
may force some into the pipeline whose deportation ICE would not
have otherwise pursued. Just like Cook County, however, Maricopa
has no meaningful way to ensure that particular types of violators
among those they identify are prioritized. Any disagreements about
the “which ones” question are reduced to a tug of war regarding the
“how many” question.
Sub-federal actors opposed to federal policy are rarely put in a
position to assess and articulate their own priorities in a manner that
exposes them to the democratic pressures of their constituents.
Instead, arrest patterns might follow the priorities asserted by a
sheriff or a chief of police. In most jurisdictions, even such agencylevel guidance is absent, and the officer on the street exercises the
authority to determine who comes into contact with the immigration
201
enforcement apparatus.
LEAs and their officers are certainly not
unaccountable. But in an arena characterized by overlapping
jurisdictional authority, it is difficult to ascertain what level of
government and what actors are responsible for policing choices that
202
drive deportation patterns.
As a result, the toughest questions about deportation do not get
asked or answered explicitly by those levels of government that are in
the best position “to assess and manage the tradeoffs among
203
conflicting public goals peculiar to their polities.”
Inducing subfederal authorities to grapple explicitly with the tradeoffs that attend
deportation choices would subject these choices to some level of
public scrutiny and input. Opening the debate in this way, and
explicitly identifying particular sub-federal government branches as
those responsible for setting priorities, is preferable to a de facto
ceding of enforcement policy to the opaque discretion of LEAs and
other actors within the local criminal justice apparatus.
Are there any reasons to value the status quo? Might the stand201

According to one survey, 51% of city police departments and 44% of county
sheriffs had no policies with regard to whether and when officers should seek to
investigate an individual’s immigration status. Varsanyi et al., supra note 167, at 146;
see also Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REV.
901, 923 (2011) (arguing that nearly any “transparent policy to guide police
discretion,” whether it emanates from the federal, state, or local levels of
government, is preferable to “none at all”).
202
Because an LEA might be subject to different city-, county-, and state-level
policies, any of these may be used to justify the exercise of street-level discretion. See,
e.g., Varsanyi et al., supra note 167, at 151 (describing how multijurisdictional overlap
allows individual officers to use their discretion without direct accountability).
203
Schuck, supra note 10, at 70.
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off between the federal government and states and localities be
tolerable, or even valuable, as an exercise in uncooperative
204
Incontestably, there is value in this sort of
federalism?
205
disagreement, in the “institutional equivalent of civil disobedience.”
But if the value of non-cooperation is not solely to “throw[] a
206
wrench” into the enforcement of federal law, but also “to change
207
national policy,” then its value is contingent on its outcomes.
Doubtless, many sub-federal political actors, dissatisfied though
they may be with federal policy, find their own lack of de jure
authority quite advantageous. De jure disempowerment allows subfederal officials to engage in blame-shifting, and it allows rebellious
jurisdictions to set or frame the agenda. As Rick Su argues, Arizona
and other restrictionist actors succeeded in focusing the public
debate on the “amnesty”/”attrition by enforcement” dichotomy,
ascribing to the federal government the unwillingness to enforce the
208
law.
If a success for Arizona, it is largely a symbolic one: framing
the choice as one between amnesty and attrition is a dead-end
proposition as a practical matter. And as argued in Part I, the choice
between deporting the entire deportable population and deporting
none fails to capture what is actually at stake in managing migration.
It fails to capture the substantive reasons why people oppose,
welcome, or tolerate immigrants in their midst.
D. A Path to Decentralization of Priority-Setting
This Article offered a functional argument for decentralizing
priority setting, and an account of the status quo that highlights the
practical shortcomings of centrally determined, nation-wide
priorities. While a fully worked-out proposal for decentralizing
priority-setting is beyond the scope of this Article, a few observations
are useful to demonstrate the feasibility of such a proposal.
How might decentralized priority-setting be instituted? It might
204

See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, YALE
L. J. 1256, 1264 (2009) (arguing that there is “a normative case for valuing such
resistance”). The invocation of uncooperative federalism here is not intended to
imply that any one of the dominant models of federalism describes or should inform
the relationship between federal and sub-federal states. As Huntington, supra note
13, at 830, rightly observes, “[c]urrent state and local immigration regulation does
not fall neatly into any one model of federalism but instead embodies strains of many
of the models.”
205
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 204, at 1271.
206
Id. at 1280.
207
Id. at 1272.
208
Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339 (2013).
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be accomplished by simply offering states or localities the option to
formulate their own priorities, or to default to the federal priorities.
The jurisdictions that choose to formulate their own might generate
them by a legislative, administrative, or some other process. At
present, ICE officers and attorneys in every field office must consult
federal priorities every time a deportable immigrant is brought to
their attention. There is no overriding reason why the priorities of
the jurisdiction that identified the individual cannot be considered in
the same manner. Though doubtless more administratively complex,
this sort of determination is not all that different from what was
209
required of INS officials prior to the creation of DHS.
Some jurisdictions are likely to refuse to go through the
exercise. A county that is unwavering in its adherence to “attrition by
enforcement” may carry on the same subversive tactics described
above in the face of the default federal priorities. In such a case, the
situation would be at worst unchanged.
At best, however,
constituents who harbor distinct concerns related to unauthorized
immigration might pressure their officials to opt out from the federal
default and craft more locally appropriate priorities. In a regime
where sub-federal levels of government have the option to
meaningfully influence deportation patterns, shifting the blame for
misplaced priorities onto the federal government would not be quite
as advantageous.
What kinds of priorities might jurisdictions choose?
A
jurisdiction that places no value on targeting aggravated felons or
national security risks would be a rare phenomenon indeed. With
regard to these cases, the federal invocation of a “broad consensus” is
210
plausible. These cases, however, are a small share of all deportees.
209

See CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE INS INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY:
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS, HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY 2 (2002) (statement of Richard Stana, Director, Justice Issues) (In 1999,
INS identified five non-mutually-exclusive priorities for interior enforcement. The
third consideration, in order of importance, called upon INS officials to “[r]espond
to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration. In addition to
responding to local law enforcement issues and needs, this strategic priority
emphasizes working with local communities to identify and address problems that
arise from the impact of illegal immigration, based on local threat assessments.”),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA402860.
210
While opinions differ on which felonies are dangerous, examining the crimes
for which aliens are most commonly deported is instructive. In 2011, criminal aliens
made up 48% of all removals. Only 15% of all removals are for crimes such as
assault, larceny, robbery, burglary, and sexual and family offences. Over 65% of
criminal aliens (about 31% of all removals) were convicted of criminal traffic
offenses, drug crimes (including possession), or criminal immigration violations
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And some “sanctuary” jurisdictions are likely to have no further
priorities. For the remainder, jurisdictions may choose to target
enforcement resources on any number of bases. Those bases may be
geographic, with priority accorded to deportations from a township
rather than another. They may be occupational, with priority
accorded to deporting, say, construction workers (who are perceived
to compete with the native work force in a given area) over
agricultural workers (who address an otherwise unmet demand for
labor). They may depend on familial status, focusing on adults
without children, but forbearing with regard to families with children
in areas where school enrollment is otherwise insufficient. Or,
priorities may be based on any other basis that is plausibly related to
the consequences of migrant presence of most serious concern to the
particular community (and does not run afoul of constitutional
211
protections). It is not easy to predict what criteria priorities would
be based on precisely because this is not an exercise sub-federal
authorities have engaged in often. One might suspect however, that
remaining in the country after a final removal order, a priority for
DHS, does not correlate very well with any consequences of
immigration that are likely to concern citizens most.
This is not an argument for devolving final control over
deportation decisions, to which there are binding legal obstacles.
DHS would retain control over final orders, including the ability to
forbear from action with respect to categories of migrants that
present specific and compelling national interests. For example,
local priorities would yield before a determination of a Temporary
Protected Status for a particular group of immigrants or the need to
deport individuals who present a threat to national security. ICE may
even continue to exercise discretion on the basis of humanitarian
factors. None of these categories are likely to be numerically
significant. Even the long list of humanitarian factors ICE identifies
as grounds for forbearance rarely result in such: the systematic review
(including entry and reentry). JOHN SIMANSKY & LESLEY M. SAPP, DHS, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS:
2011
6
(Sept.
2012),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigrationstatistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf.
211
Formal priority-setting would be no more immune from constitutional equalprotection constraints than law enforcement practices: to the extent that racial
profiling and discriminatory enforcement practices run afoul of constitutional
protections, so would priorities based on grounds of race or nationality. Moreover,
an attempt to prioritize immigrants of a particular ethnicity or nationality over others
is not a practically useful criterion, insofar as the majority of immigrants in most
areas are homogenous in this regard.
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of all pending cases for conformance with federal priorities closed
212
about 2% of those reviewed. A considerable share of deportees may
be selected in accordance with sub-federal priorities without
interfering with the focus on the most dangerous felons or
forbearance with regard to humanitarian factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Immigration and immigration enforcement laws manage
unavoidable demographic change.
Some commentators have
claimed that there is no “fixing” the immigration enforcement system
until we fix the immigration system, by pushing through
comprehensive immigration reform. It is imprudent to think,
however, that even a significant liberalization of the legal admission
criteria and a wide-reaching amnesty would obviate the need to think
213
hard about the deportation conundrum.
Legal constraints on
immigration are not futile. But what we have learned about
migration suggests strongly that it is considerably more responsive to
economic factors and push factors than legal constraints in source
214
countries.
As two prominent scholars of migration conclude,
212

See TRAC, ICE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION PROGRAM (June 28, 2012) (On
August 11, 2011, DHS announced a comprehensive review of all removal cases
pending before (and incoming to) the EOIR, to separate priority from non-priority
cases,
and
administratively
close
the
latter.),
available
at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/287/.
213
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the
Rule of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2008) (Lest mistaken hopes be repeated,
recall that the claim in 1986 was “that we were going to end illegal immigration
forever. . . . This story does not sell today. There is no reasonable claim that the
package of measures that were debated in the House and the Senate and supported
by the President will have any material impact on undocumented migration.”).
214
See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey & Fernando Riosmena, Undocumented Migration from
Latin America in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 294 (2010) (“Available data have consistently pointed up the failure of U.S.
policies to reduce undocumented migration from Latin America. . . . Our estimates
suggest that undocumented migration is grounded more in mechanisms posited by
social capital theory and the new economics of labor migration . . . . As a result, U.S.
efforts to increase the costs of undocumented entry and reduce the benefits of
undocumented labor have proven unsuccessful given the widespread access of Latin
Americans to migrant networks. The main effect of U.S. enforcement efforts has
been to reduce the circularity of Latin American migration.”); Angela S. García,
Return to Sender? A Comparative Analysis of Immigrant Communities in ‘Attrition Through
Enforcement’ Destinations, 2012 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1 (2012) (“[T]he analysis
indicates that immigrants do not alter the duration of time they spend in receiving
locales or change their state of residence due to restrictive subnational policies.
Rather, economic and social factors more prominently shape immigrants’ settlement
and
residency
patterns.”),
available
at
http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-
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“migration flows can become self-sustaining and virtually
215
unstoppable.” The Gallup Poll estimates that:
[a]bout 13% of the world’s adults—or more than 640
million people—say they would like to leave their country
permanently. Roughly 150 million adults say they would
like to move to the U.S.—giving it the undisputed title as
the world’s most desired destination for potential migrants
216
since Gallup started tracking these patterns in 2007.
The United States will continue to be a magnet for people all
over the world. This is so in large part for reasons beyond the
217
In that light, our immigration laws and
nation’s control.
enforcement policies are not simply mechanisms to select new
members of the national community at our leisure, but indispensable
tools to manage inevitable demographic change. The feasible
choices entail selecting which types of people the country will
welcome, or at least tolerate, and which it will seek to expel—not the
choices between complete enforcement and minimal enforcement.
Focusing the national conversation almost exclusively on the latter
dimension is both divisive and counterproductive. Inviting subfederal governments to participate in a conversation about priorities
in immigration enforcement would be a step towards changing that
conversation.

content/uploads/2012/08/Garcia-2012-ERS_Return-to-Sender.pdf;
Emilio
A.
Parrado, Immigration Enforcement Policies, the Economic Recession, and the Size of Local
Mexican Immigrant Populations, 641 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 16 (2012)
(“The study finds that outside of four influential outliers . . . there is no evidence that
the 287(g) program impacted the size of the Mexican immigrant population,” and
“highlights the limited efficacy of immigration enforcement as a way to resolve the
issue of the undocumented immigrant population.”).
215
ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBEN RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 18 (3d
ed. 2006); see also Peter Andreas, The Making of Amerexico (Mis)Handling Illegal
Immigration,
11
WORLD
POL’Y
J.
45
(1994),
available
at
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/documents/Making_of_Am
erexico.pdf.
216
Jon Clifton, 150 Million Adults Worldwide Would Migrate to the U.S., GALLUP (Apr.
20,
2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153992/150-Million-Adults-WorldwideMigrate.aspx?ref=more.
217
See supra note 214; see also Antje Ellermann, The Limits of Unilateral Migration
Control: Deportation and Inter-state Cooperation, 43 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 168 (2008),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00248.x
/abstract; James F. Hollifield, The Emerging Migration State, 38 INT’L MIGR. REV. 885
(2004).

